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Bargaining Orders Without An
Election: The National Labor
Relations Board's "Final Solution"
By ROBERT J. AFFELDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is the intent of the National Labor Relations Act to protect
the right of workers in freely choosing whether they wish to par-
ticipate in an industrial form of government-unionism and col-
lective bargaining.1 The orthodox and historical method by which
employees usually have expressed their preference either for or
against unions has been the secret ballot election. 2 These "repre-
sentation elections" are held by the National Labor Relations
Board [hereinafter referred to as NLRB, or the Board] when at
least thirty percent of the employees in a bargaining unit support
a union.3 In order for the union to be certified, a majority within
the unit must vote for the union. The Board closely supervises
these elections, jealously guarding the election booth with all the
safeguards at its command.4 If the Board feels that any irregulari-
ties or unfair election practices have influenced the election re-
0 Visiting Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
'National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 7, 61 Stat. 140
(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities.....
(Empahasis added.)2 NLRA § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1964).
3The Board in its discretion dec:de! uron 30% as a substantial number.
West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 309, 312 (:946).4 In General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), 'he Board defined its high
test of laboratory conditions," saying that "[c]onduct that creates an atmosphere
which renders improbable a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an
election, even though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice."
Id. at 126.
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sults, it may, upon request of a party, invalidate the election and
order another one.5
However, during the last four years, the NLRB has favored a
new method-open voting in the form of authorization cards. In
those instances when the union obtains a majority of the authoriza-
tion cards within a bargaining unit, on or off the employer's
premises, and makes a demand upon the employer to bargain,
the Bcard permits the union to short-circuit the secret ballot
election process and establish itself as the bargaining representa-
tive at the time of the demand. This departure from past policy
has succeeded in giving rise to the most controversial issue in
Labor Law today-the authenticity of the card authorization
process.
The Board's power to issue bargaining orders without an
election, or despite an election, when the union possesses a
majority of the authorization cards is derived from section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act.6 Section 10 (c) grants the
Board power to remedy the effects of unfair labor practices.
Under Section 9 (c) the Board's power is limited; it can only
order a new election. Under Section 10 (c) the Board's power is
expansive-it may take affirmative action such as issuing bargaining
orders to cure the effects of unfair labor practices. The power to
draw upon this section to issue bargaining orders, at least in cases
of intense employer coercion, was upheld by the courts at an
early stage, although the Board has rarely exercised this power.
In Frank Bros. v. NLRB,7 the employer waged an intensely
coercive campaign against the union after the union, having 45
out of 80 authorization cards, had requested him to bargain.
The union withdrew its election petition, alleging that the hold-
ing of an election was futile. The United States Supreme Court up-
held the Board's compulsory bargaining order without an election
G Claussen Baking Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 111 (1961); Myrna Mlls, Inc., 133
N.L.R.B. 767 (1961).
649 Stat. 454 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) provides:
If ... the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in
the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall . .. issue and cause to be served on such
person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such un-
fai_- labor practice, and to take such atirmative action including reinstate-
ment of employees, with or without back pay, as will effectuate the poli-
cies of this subchapter.
7 21 US. 702 (1944).
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saying that the authorization cards were a better indicia of em-
ployee desires than a fruitless election.8 The Court's approach
was completely functional-cause and effect-looking to the effect
of the employer's unfair campaign upon the employees. Its
bargaining order was a remedial order issued under Section 10 (c)
of the Act.
In Joy Silk Mill, Inc. v. NLPLB,9 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals found that the employer's rejection of the union's
request to check the signatures of 38 of 52 employees against the
company's records and his commission of serious unfair labor
practices prejudiced the results of the election which the union
lost. The court found a Section 8 (a) (5) 10 violation and said:
An employer may refuse recognition to a union when moti-
vated by a good faith doubt as to that union's majority status.
When, however, such refusal is due to a desire to gain time
and to take action to dissipate the union's majority, the refusal
is no longer justifiable and constitutes a violation of the duty
to bargain set forth in section 8(a) (5) of the Act.11
The Board thus had two legal weapons to use against em-
ployers who frustrated its election process through unfair labor
practices: the 8 (a) (1),12 8 (a) (2)13 or 8 (a) (3)14 bargaining order,
emphasizing the futility of an election because of the effect of the
employer's coercive conduct upon the employees, and the Joy
Silk Mill 8 (a) (5) bargaining order, emphasizing the employer's
culpability in terms of his state of mind-his intent to interfere
with the Board's election process by refusing to bargain with the
majority union.
The highly conceptual and subjective nature of the Section
8 (a) (5) "duty to bargain in good faith" vested the Board as the
decision-maker with broad power to guess at the employer's state
of mind and to find bad faith. The Board took a narrow view
of "good faith," viewing it as a factual doubt not as a reasonable
doubt.1 Commentators accused the Board of not being so much
8id.
9 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
10 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
11 185 F.2d at 741.
1261 Stat. 141 (19 47), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964).
13 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1964).
14 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(8) (1964).
15 See Piggly Wiggly El Dorado Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 445 (1965), where the
(Continued on next page)
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interested in discovering and remedying the effect of employer
unfair labor practices as in punishing the employers for inter-
fering with its election process, notwithstanding the fact that the
unfair labor practices had no effect upon the employees. 16 The
Joy Silk Mill doctrine as interpreted by the Board eventually
crystallized into a per se rule. If the employer gave no supportable
reason for refusing recognition, the Board indulged in the irrebut-
table presumption that the refusal was motivated only by the em-
ployer's desire to gain time in order to dissipate the union's
majority.'7 It found employers who had committed no unfair labor
practices, but who had refused recognition at the time of the
union's presentation of cards, guilty of bad faith because the
employer had given the wrong reasons for refusal.' s Also, if the
employer had given reasons for refusal, his subsequent unfair
labor practices, however slight, reflected, the Board said, his earlier
bad faith at the time of refusal.' 9
In 1966, in Aaron Brothers,20 the Board, probably in response
to the flurry of criticisms directed at it,21 modified its punitive,
"state of mind," Joy Silk Mill doctrine. In the future, the Board
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Board adopted the trial examiner's statement: "a reasonable doubt is not equivalent
to a good faith doubt." Id. at 453. At first the courts agreed with the Board. In
NLRB v. Glasgow Co., 356 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1966), the court said:
[T]he testimony of Glasgow and Leone as to their 'doubt' reveals nothing
with respect to a basis for the doubt. To be 'fair' or in 'good faith,' doubt
must have a rational basis in fact .... Here there is no evidence of pro-
bative value to justify good faith doubt. In addition to its failure to
reveal any reason for their 'belief,' the record discloses no action upon
the part of Glasgow, Leone, or any other representative of the company,
to attempt to verify the union's claim, either through inquiry addressed
to the union or to the employees. Id. at 479.
16 Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Y ix L.J. 805 (1966), where it is
further noted that:
The good faith test assumes that the need to deter employer misconduct
outweighs other important policies of the Ac. ... The Joy Silk rationale
in effect authorizes a sanction almost penal in nature, not otherwise
available to the Board. Id. at 819.
17 Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enfc-ced, Snow v. NLRB, 308
F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
18 H. & W. Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 852 (1966).
19 The cases here are too numerous to cite, but as an iilustzation see Copeland
Oil Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 126 (1966); Tony R. Santangello, 154 N.L.R.B. 1649
(1965).
20 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
21 Note, Refusal to Recognize Charges under Section 8(a) (5) of the LMRA:
Card Checks and Emplnyee Free Choice, 83 U. Cm. L. REv. 387, 397-401 (1966).
See also Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining the
Union's Majority, 16 LAB. L.J. 434 (1965).
(Continued on next page)
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said, in determining good or bad faith, it would look to the nature
and effect of the employer's unfair labor practice upon the em-
ployees, not to the employer's state of mind. No longer, the Board
said, would it apply a per se rule regarding all subsequent unfair
labor --ractices as proof positive of bad faith, but would consider
the effect on the employees- whether the unfair practices were
substantial or unsubstantial. The employer, the Board said, has
an absolute right to an election by remaining neutral or silent-
giving no supportable reasons for refusing recognition-but he
also has a duty if he remains silent not to commit any sub-
stantial unfair labor practices, for if he does, he risks a bargaining
order, with the Board imputing bad faith to him.
The Board said:
An election by secret ballot is normally a more satisfactory
means of determining employees" wishes, although authoriza-
tion cards signed by a majority may also evidence their de-
sires. Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith, an em-
ployer, presented with a majority card showing and a bargain-
ing request, will not be held to have violated his bargaining
obligation under the law simply because he refuses to rely
upon cards, rather than an election, as the method for deter-
mining the union's majority.22
Not completely rejecting the intent test, the Board de-empha-
sized it by asserting that the employer had no duty to give any
supportable or unsupportable reasons for refusing recognition,
the presumption being that his silence indicated good faith with
supportable reasons. Member Jenkins in his concurring opinion
said: "A mere absence of a good faith doubt of majority, an un-
supported expression of doubt, or a 'no opinion' attitude toward
its existence does not require the employer to accept the cards as
proof of [the majority]. '23 He sounded a caveat, however, hinting
that Joy Silk Mills was not dead by saying that a refusal to bargain
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
It has been noted that:
Under this presumption that unfair labor practices later in time con-
clusively demonstrate prior intent, the Joy Silk test operated for many
years as a per se rule. Virtually any unfair labor practice precluded the
employer from proving good faith doubt when the cards were presented
and triggered the order to bargain. Note, 75 YALE L.J., supra note 16, at
813-14.
22 158 N.L.R.B. at 1078.
23 Id. at 1080-81 (concurring opinion).
1969]
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charge may still be proved "by independent knowledge of the
employer that a union has a majority. '24
The promise of the functional or effect approach enunciated
in Aaron Brothers never materialized. The "independent know-
ledge" test swallowed up the functional aspects of the decisions.5
Except for a few scattered cases,2 6 which the Board dismissed for
unsubstantial unfair labor practices, the Board retained its sub-
jective good faith doctrine, finding employer bad faith unless he
gave supportable reasons.27 Thus, contrary to the Board's state-
ment in Aaron Brothers, that it would not regard an unsub-
stantial unfair labor practice as evidence of bad faith, the em-
ployer, if he commits any unfair labor practice after union de-
mand, must possess or give supportable reasons. If he gives no
reasons, 28 the wrong reasons, 29 or unsupported reasons, 0 the Board
will find him in bad faith and order him to bargain.
24 Id. at 1081 (concurring opinion).25 In Heck's Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1967), the Board, unable or unwilling
to issue an 8(a) (5) bargaining order on such a slight infraction as an employer
poll of his employees, managed to issue the order on the ground that the employer
ew of the union's majority, imputing the knowledge of his supervisor to him.
If the employer communicates no supportable reasons and commits minor un-
fair labor practices, the Board will find them to be major unfair labor practices
committed with the purpose of dissipating the majority. In Cohen Bros. Fruit Co.,
166 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1967), the trial examiner applied the Aaron Bros. functional
approach and dismissed the 8(a) (5) charge because the minor unfair labor
practices had no effect on the employees or the election. The union contended
that because of its majority status, in fact, and the appropriateness of its unit, it
was entitled to recognition regardless of the nature of the employer's doubt as to
its majority, making the employer's failure to bargain a violation of Section
8(a) (5). But as the trial examiner held, and as the union itself conceded, it is not
the fact of majority status that is important, but rather the employers state of
mind. Continuing, the examiner pointed out that:
The question of how to ascertain an employer's state of mind in this
area is a most vexatious one. In a series of recent cases, including Aaron
Brothers, Harmond and Irving, and Cameo Lingerie, the Board has in-
dicated that the determinative factor is the nature and gravity of the
employer's unfair labor practices; e.g., whether they are 'substantial'
(Aaron Brother's), 'extensive' (Harmond and Irving), or 'serious' (Cler-
mont's Inc.), 154 N.L.R.B. No. 11.
The Board, in reversing the trial examiner, found that independent evidence
revealed that the employer had knowledge of the unions majority and that he
never questioned . . . the union's majority status."
26Union Carbide, 166 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (1967); 20th Century Glove Co.,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (1967).
27 Dayton Food Fair Stores, 165 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1967); Heek's, Inc., 166
N.L.R.B. 760 (1967).28 Hecks, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 760 (1967).
29 Steel City Transp. Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1967).
30 Shoppers Fair (Superior Sales, Inc.), 151 N.L.R.B. 1604 (1965). In this
case the Board stated:
Although respondent indicated its doubt of the union's majority
(Continued on next page)
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The Board possesses inherent power to establish and to ad-
minister its own rules over its election process. 3' In 1954, it
established the Aiello Dairy Farms32 procedural rule. This rule
gave the union the choice of two alternatives when the employer
refused to recognize a union who claimed to represent a majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit. It could either pro-
ceed to an election or file an 8 (a) (5) unfair labor practice charge.
If it proceeded to an election and lost, it was estopped from chal-
lenging the results of the election by filing an 8 (a) (5) charge.
If it chose the unfair labor practice route instead of the election
alternative and won, the Board would issue a bargaining order
without an election. If it failed to prove the charge, of course, the
matter was concluded.
In 1964, without warning, the Kennedy Board changed all this.
In the classic case of Bernel Foam, 3 the Board gave the union "two
bites at the apple."34 No longer would the union be compelled to
select one of two alternatives, but instead would have two non-
exclusive alternatives-it could go to an election and subsequently
file an unfair labor practice charge under 8 (a) (5). If an employer
has knowledge of a union's majority or commits an unfair labor
practice after the union's demand, and the union files for an
election and loses, the union may still file a Section 8 (a) (5) un-
fair labor practice against the employer. If the union in its charge
prevails, the Board will order the employer to bargain with the
union despite the fact that the union lost the election. Losing the
election, the Board said, is not a waiver of the right to follow the
unfair labor practice route.
Until 1964, the date of the Bernel Foam decision, the election
process, not the bargaining order, was the Board's favorite device
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
representation, there is nothing the record which would support an
inference that a reasonable basis existed for a good faith doubt. Id. at
1609.
31 In Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953), the Board said:
We institute this rule pursuant to our statutory authority and obligation
to conduct elections in circumstances and under conditions which will
insure employees a free and untrammeled choice. Id. at 429.
32 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954).
33 Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
84Id. at 1291 (dissenting opinion). The Board has limited the rule in that
an election must be set aside by timely and meritorious union objections. Irving
Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1965); Koplin Bros. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1378(1964) (where the union failed to file objections to the election.)
1969]
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for testing employee preference. Also labor unions usually chose
the secret ballot election, and thereby automatically waived any
right to a bargaining order through an 8 (a) (5) charge. When the
Board, however, in Bernel Foam expanded the opportunity of
unions to acquire bargaining orders, unions for the most part
seized upon authorization cards as their favorite organizational
tool, de-emphasizing organizational picketing, principally because
acquisition of cards was much more rapid, more certain and less
expensive. Perhaps at no other time in the Board's history, at
least in the organizational arena, has a procedural doctrine so
swiftly revolutionized techniques and counter-techniques.
In Irving Air Chute,35 the Board limited the reach of Bernel
Foam by saying that a union, by going to an election, waives pre-
petition unfair labor practices no matter how flagrant or how im-
possible they have made an election.3 6 The Board will only act on
an 8 (a) (5) charge filed by a union which has lost an election
when that election has been set aside on the basis of meritorious
objections filed in the representation proceeding. This means
that any unfair conduct must have occurred between the date the
petition for election was filed and the date of the election.37
The present state of Board law on the duty of the employer to
recognize a union on the basis of authorization cards is as follows.
When a union makes a demand for recognition upon the employer
based upon the claim that it possesses a majority of the authoriza-
tion cards, a prima facie case of the duty to recognize is established.
The employer has three alternatives. One, he can recognize the
union. Two, he can remain silent, refusing to give any reasons for
refusing to recognize it. If he remains neutral, that is, commits no
unfair labor practices, he will obtain an election. This position,
however, involves a high risk, for if he does commit an unfair
labor practice, substantial or unsubstantial, the Board is inclined
to interpret his previous silence (no supportable reasons) as mask-
ing bad faith and thus order him to bargain. Three, he can refuse
t:: recognize the union by giving supportable reasons-proving his
good faith. In this way, if his reasons are supportable, he can
35 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964).36 Id. at 629-30.37 1ndependent, Inc. The Daily Advertiser, 165 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1967);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453 (1962); Green Bay Aviation,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1967).
[Vol. 57,
BARGANImG OBDERs
escape an 8 (a) (5) bargaining order. A good faith doubt, however,
is not a reasonable doubt-it is something more. A well-founded
suspicion that a majority does not exist is insufficient. If he gives
the wrong reasons, or unsupported reasons, and commits minor
unfair labor practices, the Board will find him in bad faith and
order him to bargain. An employer must not only entertain a
doubt, but must demonstrate to the Board's satisfaction that it is
a "factual doubt" which proves the union had no majority.38 If,
for instance, upon union demand he refused recognition because
he questioned the appropriateness of the unions bargaining unit
and later the Regional Director, through inclusions or exclusions,
agrees with him, but the final number in the bargaining unit does
not change the union's majority status, he will be held to have
been in bad faith at the time of the union's original demand. 9
The employer who offers supportable reasons for refusing
recognition reduces immeasurably the risk of an 8 (a) (5) charge
being leveled against him. It might even be said that he pos-
sesses a license to commit subsequent unfair labor practices against
his employees because his grounded reasons prove that his intent
is not to dissipate the majority. He is in good faith as far as section
8 (a) (5) is concerned.40 He is, however, vulnerable to an 8 (a) (1),
8 (a) (2) or 8 (a) (3) bargaining order, for the test of a bargaining
order under those sections is not good or bad faith but one of
cause and effect-the restoration of the status quo before the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices.
The Board's expanded policy of issuing bargaining orders on
the basis of authorization cards instead of a secret ballot election,
and its new policy of permitting unions to obtain a bargaining
order after losing an election, has ignited a flurry of criticism
from Congress, commentators, and the courts. Senators Javits and
Fannin have introduced bills in the Senate attempting to curtail
38 See note 15 supra.89 Dixie Color Printing Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1966).40 In NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 7.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967), the Second
Circuit, referring to the Board's Aaron Bros. decision, said:
This comes close to saying that when the evidence shows that an em-
ployer has a good faith doubt of the union's majority, unfair labor
practices directed at undermining the union will be given effect not so
much as evidence effectively contradicting existence of the doubt, as to
which their probative force is often slight, but rather as a violation of §
8(a) (1) so serious as to make a bargaining order an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 208.
19691
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the power of authorization cards.41 Commentators feel that present
Board policy perverts both the purpose and policy of the National
Labor Relations Act.42 Before Taft Hartley, they say, the Wagner
Act authorized the Board to "take a secret ballot of employees, or
utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representa-
tives."'43  (Emphasis added). However, it is pointed out that
Section 9 (c) was amended by the Taft Hartley Congress, requiring
the Board to use only the secret ballot procedure in deciding
questions of representation. Hence, the argument runs, the
41 Senator Javits introduced two bills, S. 2133 on June 14, 1965, 111 CONG.
t:a. 12989, 12994 (1965), and a revised one, S. 2395 on Aug. 11, 1965, 111
CONG. REC. 19308 (1965). Senator Fannin introduced S. 2226 on June 29, 1965,
111 CONG. REc. 14584 (1965). Legislation would not be necessary if the courts
would adopt Justice Friendly's view that the duty to clarify should rest with the
union. In NLRB 1. S. E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967) he said:
But while clarity should constitute the beginning of any effort to show a
majority on the basis of authorization cards, it is not the end; the clearest
written words can be perverted by oral misrepresentations, especially to
ordinary working people unversed in the 'witty diversities' of labor law.
It is all too easy for the Board or a reviewing court to fall into the error
of thinking that language clear to them was equally clear to em-
ployees previously unexposed to labor relations matters; to treat authoriza-
tion cards, which union organizers present foz filling out and signing
and then immediately take away, as if they were wills or contracts
carefully explained by a lawyer to his client is to substitute form
for reality. The very argument by which the Board has upheld unions
even when the cards were deceptively worded, namely, of placing
'more emphasis upon the representations made to the employees at the
time the cards were signed than upon the language set forth in the cards,'
NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra, 341 F.2d at 754, works against
it here. In our view the evidence demands a conclusion that at least three
of the signers were induced to affix their signatures by statements causing
them to believe that the union would not achieve representative status
without an election.
0 * 0 *
The testimony is clear enough to us; housewives working as sales-
ladies in discount stores are not to be charged with the learning of the
Labor Board's trial examiners. Id. at 442-43.42 Browne, The Labor Board Unsettles the Scales, 42 NoimE DAM L. REV.
145 (1967) where the author states:
In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, Congress withdrew the Board's
authority to 'utilize any other suitable method.' Yet the Board, under a
patent distortion of the doctrine of Joy Silk Mills, Inc. had held that
where an employer commits alleged unfair labor practices, even though
they be insubstantial, he demonstrates a lack of good faith doubt in a
union's claim for recognition and can be ordered to bargain with the
union without an election. Id. at 154.
See 75 YALE L.J., supra note 16, at 809, where it is noted that: "Designation by
cards rests upon a strained reading of the National Labor Relations Act. . . . The
theory authorizing this card procedure involves the use of section 8(a)(5) (an
unfair labor practice provision) as a detour around section 9(c) (the secret
ballot election provision)." See also Id. at 820-23.
43 Wagner Act, oh. 312, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1985).
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legislative history is quite clear that the purpose of the revision
was to grant the employer an absolute right to an election.44
It is asserted that not only history but statutory policy militates
against present Board practices. The fundamental value which
Congress intended to protect during the organizational stage was
not the institutional power of either the union or the company,
but that of the employee-his freedom of choice in voting for or
against unionism. Accordingly, critics accuse the Board of changing
the policy of the Act from that of protecting employee freedom
of choice to promoting "the spread of unionism," 45 foisting upon
employees "a bargaining agent not necessarily of their own
choosing,"46 and subordinating "a consideration of employee free
choice to concern with policing employer conduct."47 By per-
mitting unions to organize through the back instead of the front
door, they feel that the Board is promoting instant unionism. It
is said that the effect of this policy is to place an employer in an
impossible situation-a legal dilemma-when the union makes a
demand upon him to bargain. If he refuses to recognize the union,
he risks an unfair labor practice charge-an 8 (a) (5) or 8 (a) (1)
bargaining order; if he recognizes the union and it is later de-
termined that the union did not have the majority of the valid
authorization cards, he is guilty of an 8 (a) (2) unfair labor
practice-bargaining with a minority union. This latter offense
is a Labor Law capital crime, for as Justice Douglas said:
There can be no greater abridgment of section 7 of the
Act, assuring employees the right to bargain collectively
through representation of their choosing, or to refrain from
such activity, than to grant exclusive bargaining status to an
44 Outside of the 4th Circuit this argument has not been accepted by the
circuits. It seems clear that an employer has the duty to bargain with a union
when he is aware that it represents a majority of his employees. Under these cir-
cumstances he has no right to a 9(c) election. This means of course that the
union will not be certified. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring, 851
U.S. 62 (1956). Justice Sobeloff dissenting in NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson t7 Co.,
386 F.2d 551 (1967), said:
While it is true that section 9(c) now specifies that the only method the
Board can employ for certification is a secret ballot election, the statute
nowhere limits employees to this procedure and it does not make
compliance with section 9(c) a prerequisite to an 8(a)(5) violation.
Id. at 555.45 Note, Refusal to Recognize Charges under Section 8(a)(5) of the
LMRA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 83 U. CH. L. REv. 387 (1965).46 Browne, The Labor Board Unsettles the Scales, 42 NoTm D Vm L. REv.
145 (1966).47 Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 828 (1966).
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agency selected by a minority of employees, thereby im-
pressing that agency on the nonconsenting majority.48
The Board itself on occasions has spoken out against authoriza-
tion cards, calling them "a notoriously unreliable method of
determining majority status of a union .... -49 "It is well known
that membership cards obtained during the heat of rival orga-
nizing campaigns... do not necessarily reflect the ultimate choice
of a bargaining representative."50 Also, the AFL-CIO has said
that "NLRB pledge cards are at best a signifying of intention at
a given moment."'51
The courts for the most part are highly suspicious not only
of the authenticity of authorization cards-how the union obtained
them-but also of what constitutes good faith upon the em-
ployer's part. The Circuit Courts have restrained the Board on
both fronts. They are inclined, unlike the Board, to hold the
union solicitor of cards to a much higher standard in determining
misrepresentation. 2 They are broadening the concept of em-
ployer good faith along two lines; first, by defining good faith in
terms of an honest and reasonable doubt 53 and, second, by not
regarding a subsequent unfair labor practice as conclusive evidence
of his earlier state of mind when the employer has given reason-
able reasons for refusal. 54 As the court stated in NLRB v. River
Togs, Inc.: 5
48 International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961).
49 Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 550-51 (1952).
50 Midwest Piping Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 n.13 (1945).
51 AFL-CIO GUIDEBOOK FOR UNION ORANIZES (1961), quoted in Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and PublicWelfare, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1965).52NLRB v. Peterson Bros., inc., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965).
53 In Peoples Serw. Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1967),
the court said:
The nwere fact that Peoples was guilty of unfair labor practices in con-
nection with the union organizational campaign is not sufficient in and of
itself to negative a doubt on the part of management.... An employer
need not require a card check where he has a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that the cards do not reflect the uncoerced choice of his employees
or chat the employees signed the cards under a mistaken notion as to
their full import. ... The Board's retrospective determination that the
authorization cards of a majority of the employees were valid does not
necessarily negative an employer's good faith doubt at the time he re-
fused recognition.... An honest doubt is all that is required. Id. at
556-57.
This last statement is at odds with the Board's prevailing policy that an honest or
a reasonable doubt is not effective. There must be a good faith doubt. See Piggly
Wiggly El Dorado Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 445 (1965) where the Board said: a
reasonable doubt is not the equivalent to a good faith doubt." Id. at 453.54 Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967).
55 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967).
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[W]e see no logical basis for the view that substantial evi-
dence of good faith is negated solely by an employer's desire
to thwart unionization whether by proper or even by im-
proper means .... His efforts to counter the union, almost
all of them prior to the March 17 meeting, [the date of the
union's demand and the company's refusal] were as con-
sistent with a desire to prevent the acquisition of majority
status as with a purpose to destroy an existing majority.56
The National Labor Relations Board, the courts and the
commentators agree that under normal circumstances the secret
ballot election is by far the best index of employee free choice.
They also agree that at times, because of intense employer coercion
which makes a free election impossible, authorization cards are
an adequate substitute for an election. It is recognized by most
that if the administrative process is to prove workable, it must be
armed with sanctions which are not only negative, but also
affirmative. Today, negative sanctions-cease and desist orders-
are not enough, since the regulated groups are not helpless
individuals, but are instead powerful groups and combinations
of groups which are little influenced by agency "slaps on the
wrist."
The detection of unfair labor practices means little if the
only sanction is social embarrassment. The NLRB's challenge
is not the detection and proof of unfair labor practices, but
also the next step in the process, formation of specific yet
flexible orders that give coordinated effect to the Act.sr
Over the years it became increasingly evident to the Board
that employers and their attorneys were perverting the policy of
the Act. In instance after instance it was revealed that attorneys
were advising their clients to commit unfair labor practices. For
example, if a company thought that a union had a good chance
of winning a forthcoming election, it would discharge the union
organizer. If the union went to election, its chances of winning
were slim because the momentum was usually taken out of its
organizing drive. If it filed an 8 (a) (3) charge against the company,
the delay of six mcnths to a year usually dampened enthusiasm.
An 8 (a) (3) cease and desist order, and possible reinstatement with
56 Id. at 206-07.
57 Flannery, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 94 (1963).
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back pay were considered good investments by the company in
comparison with the expense of dealing with a union.58
The Board and its critics, however, are in deep disagreement
over when the Board should issue bargaining orders based on a
card majority, and over the presumption that authorization cards
are valid votes for the union. It is the thesis of this article that the
Board has gone too far on both fronts. Issuing 8 (a) (1) bargaining
orders without an election, or in spite of an election, is "strong
medicine" 59 and there is overwhelming evidence that the Board
is issuing these orders without considering any coercive effect
upon the employees. To issue an 8 (a) (1) bargaining order for a
slight infraction-a misdemeanor-which has no effect on an
election, is to issue a punitive bargaining order, not a remedial
one.60 Section 8 (a) (1) bargaining orders should not be viewed as
an ordinary remedy, but as an extraordinary remedy, issued only
when an employer's anti-union campaign makes the holding of a
free election impossible.
In order for the card authorization process to supplant the
election process as a superior index of employee opinion, it is
necessary that the card process of open voting approach as nearly
as possible the certitude and reliability of the secret voting of
the election booth. The union should be held to a high standard
of presenting convincing evidence of majority support. To succeed
in obtaining an 8 (a) (5) bargaining order this means that affirma-
tive duties should be cast upon the union to: (1) prove its ma-
jority; (2) in an appropriate unit; (3) by making a clear demand;
and (4) proving that the employer lacked a good faith doubt (Sec-
tion 8 (a) (5)) or proving that his unfair labor practices made a
fair election impossible (Sections 8 (a) (1), (2) or (3)).
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF THE UNION TO OBTAIN A MAJORITY
- THE CARD AUTHORIZATION PROCESS UNDER SECTION 8 (a) (5)
In theory, to qualify as a bargaining representative, the union
must fulfill certain affirmative duties. It must obtain a majority
58 Id.
59 NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
The courts have viewed the purpose of bargaining orders as performing
a restorative rather than a penal or deterrent function. See Town and Country Mffg.
Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 816 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
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of the authorization cards, possess an appropriate unit, make a
clear and unequivocal demand for recognition upon the employer,
and be able to demonstrate through the General Counsel that the
employer refused to recognize the union because of his "bad
faith," generally indicated through an unfair labor practice.81
This is the black letter law; this is the facade behind which the
Board takes shelter when Congress, the courts, or commentators
fire criticism at its bargaining orders. It is difficult to oppose the
argument because everyone is opposed to unfair labor practices.
At the base of the facade, however, things are not what they
seem on the surface, clear and simple, but, in fact, are quite
multiplex. The Board has so relaxed these union affirmative
duties through legal fictions that in a practical sense they no
longer exist. The irrefutable fact is that once a union obtains a
majority of the authorization cards, the Board will twist the rub-
ber words of the common law into an affirmative duty on the part
of the company to recognize the union. The substantive law may
place the affirmative duties upon the union, but the Board's pro-
cedural law, in the form of legal presumptions, places the af-
firmative duty upon the company.
A. The Union's Affirmative Duty to Clarify the Purpose of a Dual
Authorization Card
1. Solicitation by the Union-The typical authorization card
serves two purposes: one, giving the union the power to call an
election; and two, immediately empowering the union to act as
the signer's bargaining agent without an election. In signing a
dual purpose card the employee is really performing two acts,
petitioning for an election and voting. Many doubt that he is
aware of this.
Despite the ambiguity of the cards, 62 the Board early in its
history was inclined to count all cards regardless of the solicitor's
61 It is, of course, possible for an employer to be guilty of "bad faith" with-
out committing an unfair labor practice. H & W Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 852
(1966) (However, Member Zogoria dissentzd, arguing that in the absence of
independent unfair labor practices the General Counsel failed to prove lack of
good faith. Id. at 866).
62 One commentator, Robert Lewis, notes that authorization cards are
ambiguous. He feels that the union should be obligated to use two cards, one for
the election and another for a vote. Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization
Cards in Determining the Union's Majority, 16 LAB. L. J. 484 (1965).
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statements to the employees. 3 Later, however, in Englewood
Lumber Company,64 the Board reversed its position, taking a
more restricted view of cards, and held that any union mis-
representation as to the purpose of the card invalidated it. If
employees were told that the cards were necessary for the Board
to hold "an" election by secret ballot, the Board discarded such
cards. Today, however, the Board has reverted to the policy of its
early days. In the Cumberland Shoe case,65 the Board stated it will
vitiate a card only when the solicitor expressly says that its "only"
purpose is the obtaining of an election. No inquiry into the em-
ployee's state of mind is permitted. The federal courts with the
exception of the Fifth Circuit initially endorsed this doctrine; 6
that Circuit applied the Peterson doctrine which permitted in-
quiry into why the employee signed the card. 7
03T.M.T. Trailer Ferry, Inc., 152 N.L.RB. 1495 (1965). Trial examiner
Seagle said:
In any event, these cases date from the period when the Board seemed to
subscribe to the doctrine that virtually nothing that a union solicitor
told an employee could affect the validity of his act in signing an
authorization card. Id. at 1507.
64 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961).
65 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), enforced, NLBB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp.,
351 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1965). The Board distinguished Cumberland from
Englewood but I feel they are indistnguishable. In Cumberland, the employees
were told that the purpose of the cards was for an election; those cards were
counted. While in Englewood, the employees were told that the purpose of the
cards was for an election; those cards were not counted.
66 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 906 (D. C. Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966); Happach
v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353
F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1965); NLBB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 117 (6th
Cir. 1965).
67 NLBB v. Peterson Bros., Inc. 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965). The Board
defended its Cumberland rule by saying:
the cards on their face clearly and explicitly declare their purpose. If the
cards are to be voided on the ground that the employees were misled
into believing the cards would be used for a different or more limited
purpose, this must be done on the basis of what the employees were told,
not on the basis of their subjective state of mind when they signed the
cards. NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 679, 682 (1963).
The court said:
.... In view of the language on the face of the card that 'this is not an
application for membership' and the language that in the alternative
it is 'for an NLRB election', we think there was a burden of the General
Counsel to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signer
of the card did, in effect, what he would have done by voting for the
union in a Board election. We think that in refusing to consider the
subjective intent of the signer of the card, in light of the ambiguity on
the face of the card, the Board erred. NLBB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 342
F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1965).
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Present Board policy on the signing of authorization cards is
that if a solicitor says that the purpose of the card is "an" election,
expressly refraining from saying the "only" purpose, then the
card is valid. There is a strong, almost irrebuttable presumption
that signed cards are votes for the union, reflecting the true and
uncoerced intentions of the signers. The Board is not interested in
the subjective intentions of the signers; it looks to the intent of
the solicitor and the intent of the card language, not to the in-
tent of the signers.
The validity of such affirmation can be overcome only by
establishing that the union obtained the signatures through
coercion... that the union obtained the signatures by repre-
senting to the employees that the cards would be used only
for a different, more limited purpose. This must be done on
the basis of what the employees were told, not on the basis
of their subjective state of mind when they signed the
cards.6
There are two principal forms of misrepresentation which the
Board refuses to police: "bandwagoning," i.e., informing the
employee that the majority of all of the other employees have
signed up; and informing the employee through vague language
that the union is primarily interested in an election, not a vote.
The Board has taken an inconsistent approach on band-
wagoning but lately it has been justifying these misrepresentations
on the basis that the solicitor's remarks were the truth or, if not
the truth, then mere puffing, or that the remark was not the true
cause of the employee signing the card.
Social scientists have testified that the most intense coercion
which can be directed at most people in our conformist society is
the threat of social ostracism by their peer groups. Even though
the threat of this social sanction is regarded as the supreme
punishment, the Board feels that when an employee solicitor backs
a seventeen year old high school student into a corner and tells
him that everyone in the plant except him has signed up, the
employee is not coerced. In 1965, Trial Examiner William Siegel
did not see it that way. In TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.,69 Hunter, a
union solicitor, told two employees that everyone had signed cards
68 Aero Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1283, 1290 (1964).
69 T.M.T. Trailer Ferry, Inc. and Associated Maritime Workers, Local No. 8,
152 N.L.R.B. 1495 (1965).
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and that if they would sign it would be a hundred per cent. The
Trial Examiner said:
Considering that less than a majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit bad signed authorization cards, what Hunter
told Peacock and Sharpe, in order to induce them to sign such
cards, seems to me to have constituted a gross misrepresenta-
tion. Bandwagon psychology is always an important factor
in inducing hesitant employees to sign authorization cards.
By falsely creating this bandwagon psychology Hunter was
engaged in deceiving the two employees.
Since establishing the Cumberland doctrine, the Board no
longer follows this policy. It has held that a solicitor's remarks
"that ninety percent of the west end signed," was "mere puffing"
and that it was "not a factor in card signing."7' The Board places
the affirmative duty to clarify on the employee, not the union.
When an employee testified that a solicitor told her that: "I was
one of the last ones to sign up or the last one to sign up and that
I'd better hurry and sign if I wanted to be in on it," the Board
said that it was the duty of the employee to get the facts before
she signed.72 Also, when an employee was told that he was one of
the last ones to sign up, the Trial Examiner said, "He thus had
the opportunity to verify the truthfulness of the stranger's repre-
sentations to him that 'he was one of the last ones to sign'." 73
Present Board policy on bandwagoning seems to be that if the
solicitor makes no express threats of group social sanctions the
card will count. "Such puffing does not vitiate the cards unless
the comments were means of coercing employees to sign cards out
of fear of majority reprisal."74
70 Id. at 1508.
71 Wausau Steel Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 635, 642 (1966).72 Henry Colder Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (1967). The trial examiner said:
The examiner finds and concludes that Dieffenback freely designated the
union on his card to represent him in collective bargaining with the com-
pany. This is based on the fact that Christopher's representation to
Dieffenback that he 'was one of the last ones or the last one to sign up'
was ambiguous; that Dieffenback had ample time and opportunity to
verify the representation whatever it meant; that there is no overt evi-
dence of record that Dieffenback relied upon the representation; and that
the representation coming from one salesman to another, it being in the
nature of commission salesmen to engage in a good deal of puffing and
touting, was a harmless representation. Id.
78 Id.
74 Clothing Workers v, NLRB (Sagamore Shirt Co.) 365 F.2d 898, 908 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
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The Board continues to parse the sentences of union solicitors
looking for the adverb "only." If it feels that the card is un-
ambiguous and the agent conveys the impression that an election
will probably be held, without committing himself to an election
as the only means of recognition, the Board will honor the card.
The following statements were not considered material mis-
representations: "if they get enough people they would have a
vote and the union in";75 "just to get a vote to see if there was
enough to have a vote for a union"; 76 "It didn't mean a thing-
it was just to see how many men they could get to join the union
and it didn't mean nothing if we signed it."177
Many of these cards have the word election in bold letters
scattered over their face; others explain that it represents a vote
in small letters; all are confusing, even to the lawyer. Yet the
Board imposes the duty to clarify, not on the solicitor, but on the
employee.
In a Board election it is possible for part-time high school
students working a few hours, to restructure the government of
a plant. In one recent case, a Trial Examiner included such a
part-timer in the voting unit, saying that he had a sufficient com-
munity of interest because he had worked two hours each Wed-
nesday morning unloading trucks. In a period of six months, this
employee had accumulated 69 hours of working time.78
Everyone is being pushed into the open or dosed voting booth,
including employees without temporary or permanent interest
in the election: employees who have resigned, upon the pos-
sibility that they might return;79 and employees who have sub-
mitted resignations which do not take effect until after the date
of the union's demand. 0 It is very difficult to see how these em-
ployees have any community of interest in the working conditions
of the company, but it is very easy to see how their votes can
interfere with the Section 7 rights of permanent employees and
the future of the company.
The Board's Cumberland rule has been bitterly attacked by
75Colub Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 503 (1966).7 8Wausau Steel Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 635, 642n.67 (1966).
77 Id.
78 Quality Mkts., 160 N.L.R.B. 44 (1966).
79 S & M Mf . Co., 65 L.R.R.M. 1850 (1967).
80 Quality Mt., 160 N.LJ.B. 44 (1966).
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commentators and courts.8 ' Recently, the Board found occasion
to defend its rule. In Levi Strauss & Company, 2 it said that unions
soliciting employees through the medium of dual purpose authori-
zation cards-requesting representation or an election-were not
guilty of misrepresentation when they emphasized an election
because it is usually the intent of that union at that time to seek
an election. It is only later, when the employer through the com-
mission of unfair labor practices makes an election impossible
that the union is compelled to abandon its original intent and
seek representation via the unfair labor practice route.
This attempt by the Board to justify its rule fails to answer the
objections of the critics. They feel that the Board is applying an
incorrect standard, and this latest defense, emphasizing the intent
of the union solicitor, not the intent of the card signer, only con-
firms their belief. It is the effect of the solicitor's words upon the
signer, they assert-whether he is led to think he is simply
registering for an election or voting for the union, or both-that
is important, not the union's secret intent or state of mind. 3 The
Board, entangled in the power politics of both groups, has lost sight
of the fact that the central figure here is the employee. "The
81 "It exalts one word in the English language. It places too much reliance
on testimony, often hazy, as to what was said months previously." Lewis, supra
note 62 at 440.
An employee can be deemed to have signed a valid authorization card
even though he had no intention of authorizing a union to act as his
exclusive bargaining representative and the employer can be compelled
to recognize and bargain with a union on the basis of evidence that does
not indicate what it is said to indicate .... 38 U. Cr. L. REv., supra,
note 21, at 396.
Permitting "cards signed for one purpose (an election) to be used for another,
countenances misrepresentation and fosters deceit. It adds fuel to the argu-
ment for legislative overriding of Joy Silk. ... Lewis, supra, note 62, at 617.
82 Levi Strauss & Co v. Southwest Regional joint Bd., Clothing Workers,
172 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (1968).
83 The Sixth Circuit, the original endorser of the Board's Cumberland rule,
recently abandoned it. In NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384 F.2d 609 (6th
Cir. 1968), it said:
We at once make clear that we do not consider testimony of a sub-
jective intention not to join the union as of controlling importance. ....
But it is relevant in assessing the effect of the solicitor's words, for it
casts a telling reflection on the actual communication conveyed to the
signer. The testimony of the signer as to his expressed state of mind is
also relevant in determining whether his misapprehension over the
purpose of the card was knowingly induced by the solicitor. Such induce-
ment of an employee who openly expresses an intention not to join the
union suggests that representations concerning an election were intended
to lead to a belief that the only purpose of the card was to hold an
election. (Emphasis added). Id. at 617.
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struggle is between the employer and the union, but the right to
select is the employees'. 8 4
Initially the courts, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit,8 5
adopted the Cumberland rule. Recently, however, it appears that
except for the District of Columbia Circuit Court, little is left of
the rule in the Circuits.86 Over the years the courts have tended
to view the unsupervised solicitation of dual and single purpose
cards with suspicion. The standard now, if the validity of a card
is in issue, is for the courts to cast the "burden on the General
Counsel to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
signer of the card did, in effect, what he would have done by
voting for the union in a Board election."87 In effect this means
that the courts will assume that disputed dual purpose authoriza-
don cards solicited by the union, though they are clear and
unambiguous on their face, are invalid. They can only be vali-
dated when the union demonstrates that it has fulfilled its af-
firmative duty of explaining to the signer that if the union
obtains majority status, it would or could claim representation
status without an election. The courts seem to engage in a pre-
sumption that single purpose authorization cards-calling only
for representation-are valid, but these cards too can be in-
validated if the employer can demonstrate that the employees
signed because of oral representations by the solicitor that an
election would be forthcoming.8 A few months ago, the Second
Circuit suggested to the Board that it draw up a model authoriza-
tion card. 9 If the Board fails to heed this advice, little will be left
of the Board's power to issue bargaining orders based upon
authorization cards.
2. Solicitation by Supervisors-The supervisor has largely been
a forgotten figure since the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947
eliminated him from the protection of the Act. Since 1964, how-
84 NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 1968).
85 NLRB v. Peterson Bros. Inc., 342 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1965).80 See NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1968), for
evidence that the courts have abandoned the Cumberland rule.87 NLRB v. Peterson Bros., Inc., 342 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1965).88 Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1967).89 n Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1967),
justice Friendly said:
What would truly ease the administration problem both for the Board
and for the courts would be for the Board to use its long neglected rule-
making power, and specify what a union authorization card should say
and how. Id. at 570 (concurring opinion).
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ever, the date of the Bernel Foam doctrine, he is once again begin-
ning to assume importance. In many organizational campaigns the
unions are using sympathetic supervisors as key men in either
actively or passively soliciting authorization cards. This practice
has raised novel questions with the Board. Does supervisory parti-
cipation in a union campaign invalidate all the cards or simply
some of them; those he directly solicited or simply those signed in
his presence but actually solicited by others? Does supervisory
solicitation constitute coercion and, if it does, is it coercion per se
or simply a presumption of coercion which may be rebutted by the
General Counsel? These questions and a host of others have
cropped up as a result of the new technique of union organizing
via authorization cards.
Since Bernel Foam, the Board has been inclined to define the
term "supervisor" rather narrowly in card authorization cases,
probably because an affirmative finding tends to invalidate the
cards. As a result, the trial examiners, the courts, and the Board
are fighting a running battle among themselves as to what consti-
tutes a supervisor. It is not possible to give a specific answer here,
but only to outline the general characteristics of a supervisor, for
as the decision-makers have said, it is ultimately a "question of
fact." 90
Section 2 (11) of the Act states that "the term supervisor" means
any individual having authority in the interest of the em-
ployer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or, to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.91
This section has been interpreted disjunctively, not con-
junctively-an employee may be found to be a supervisor if he
90 See Northern Va. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 800 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1962),
where the court quotes from justice Soper:
It is a question of fact in every case as to whether the individual is merely
a superior workman or leadman who exercises the control of a skilled
worker over less capable employees or a supervisor who shares the power
of management. Id. at 171.
91 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1954).
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possesses one of these characteristics.9 2 Unlike the Wagner Act, he
need not possess sanctions, the right to hire or fire; it is sufficient
that he simply possess the power "responsibly to direct" other em-
ployees.93 The key term in defining a supervisor is the use of
independent judgment, the ability to exercise discretion and re-
sponsibility without necessarily consulting with others. The cases
divide themselves into three categories: (1) clear cases of in-
dependent judgment, no closeness of supervision by higher
management; (2) middle cases, some closeness of supervision by
higher management but a dispute whether it is intimate or re-
mote; (3) clear cases of no independent judgment, a very high
degree of control by management, making the employee a lead-
man rather than a supervisor.
The NLRB has held that very close supervision by a super-
visor over another employee is a conclusive sign that the employee
is not a supervisor but at most a leadman serving as a conduit of
information. In these cases, however, certain unmistakable indicia
are always present. The employee never possesses the authority to
hire, fire, suspend, etc. He conveys orders from his superior who
usually works in close contact with him.94 He spends ninety to
ninety-five percent of his time performing non-supervisory func-
tions with five to ten percent of his time devoted to the exercise
of discretion, but even here it is principally of a clerical, routine
nature with emphasis upon skill, not management of people. He
usually follows "detailed written instructions" or a blueprint,95
assisting rather than directing. He is a conduit of information
rather than a participant in the company power process. This
92NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 162 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied 335 U.S. 908 (1948); NLRB v. Elliott Williams Co., 345 F.2d 460 (7th
Cir. 1965).
93 In Florence Printing Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 141 (1963) the Board said:
While the record is clear that Holland does not have the right to hire
and fire employees, the possession of any one of the powers enumerated in
section 2(11) of the Act is sufficient to establish supervisory status since
the section is interpreted disjunctively. Id. at 144.
94 In Plastics Workers Union v. NLRB (Sinko), 869 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1966),
the Seventh Circuit found that an employee was not a supervisor because he could
not criticize but only assisted other employees, attended no foreman meetings,
carried out instructions and was too closely supervised by another supervisor.
95 North Va. Steel Corp. v. NLBB, 300 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1962). The court
rejected the company's contention that the union solicitor of cards was a super-
visor. It held that Combs, the employee, possessed no power to responsibly direct
other employees because his independent judgment was limited to following the
instructions of blueprints.
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relationship is one of a more skilled to less skilled workers, not
that of a supervisor to the rank and file workers. Privileges, such
as attending management meetings, usually are not available to
him. Also, the proportion of supervisors to employees in these
situations is very high.
In difficult "middle" cases where the decision-maker cannot
determine whether the employee is a supervisor from the primary
characteristics of Section 2 (11), he will usually resort to secondary
characteristics, the most important of which is the proportionality
test, the percentage of supervisors to the number of employees.
In Super-Swan Cleaners,96 a good case was made that two em-
ployees were not supervisors but leadmen since they could not hire
or fire and could not "formulate, determine, or effectuate" com-
pany policy.97 They were found to be supervisors in spite of the
fact that they only directed employees in the laundry room in a
rather routine fashion largely because the proportion of super-
visors to employees was very low, one to sixty-five.
Usually, in the clear cases of the first classification, little trouble
is experienced by the decision makers. In Donald Skillings, Yankee
Distributors,98 the Board found an employee to be a supervisor
who: (I) opened the plant in the morning; (2) dosed it every
evening; (3) attended management meetings; (4) handled com-
plaints; (5) was held out to be a supervisor; and (6) was regarded
by employees to be a supervisor.99
In the matter of supervisory solicitation of union authorization
cards, the Board is applying a double standard. When a supervisor
acting in behalf of the company, threatens a union supporter, the
Board considers the threat inherently coercive under its doctrine
that it "was reasonably calculated to coerce."100 Evidence as to
the effect of the remarks on the employee is considered im-
96152 N.L.R.B. 163 (1965).
97Id. at 169. In Welsh Farms Ice Cream, 161 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1966),
the employees seemed to possess all the attributes of a supervisor especially in
responsibly directing other employees but the Board refused to find them to be
supervisors because "if two were found to be supervisors, there would be five
supervisors for eleven employees." Id.
98 152 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1965).
991d. at 1029. In Florence Printing Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 141 (1963), the
Board found an employee to be a supervisor who (1) granted time off, (2) as-
signed work, (3) changed job assignments, (4) made more money, (5) autho-
rized overtime, (6) was regarded by em loyees as a supervisor, even though the
employee had no right to hire or fire. Id. at 143-44.
100 NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954); International
Assn of Machinists v. NLRB, 811 U.S. 72 (1940).
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material; instead the Board applies a conceptual approach, looking
only to the moral state of mind of the supervisor. When a super-
visor acts on behalf of the union in soliciting cards, however, the
Board abandons the conceptual test for a scientific cause and effect
test, insisting that supervisory solicitation is not inherently co-
ercive but only coercive if the employee signed because of the
solicitor's supervisory status. It is still unclear who must bear
the burden of proof when it is demonstrated that a supervisor
solicited a card. Must the employer go further and show cause
and effect, or does there exist a presumption of coercion thereby
compelling the General Counsel to show the employee signed for
reasons other than the supervisor's influence?
The Board has taken a very narrow view of coercion in re-
spect to supervisory solicitation of cards. It has held that cards
signed in the presence of a supervisor are valid cards because of
the supervisor's "passive participation." 101 It invalidates only those
cards which he personally solicited-the products of his "active
solicitation."'1 2 Even when supervisors have been generally active
on the union's behalf during an organizational campaign, the
Board proceeds on a card to card basis, refusing to invalidate all
the cards, but only those he personally tainted.10 3
It seems obvious that supervisory solicitation of cards should
be held to be inherently coercive. One can hardly imagine more
intense coercion on an employee than when his supervisor asks
him to sign a card. The Board's approach in asking the con-
ceptual question of whether the supervisor is working for the
company's interest or in his own and the employee's interest is
101 Southland Paint Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 22 (1965). NLBB v. Great At. &
Pac. Tea Co., 346 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1965). The court said:
The Board concluded that the mere presence of Mr. LaFleur at the time
his wife signed her card did not constitute substantial evidence of im-
proper influence. We cannot say that either of those conclusions by the
Board was unwarranted. Id. at 940 n.4.
102 156 N.L.R.B. 22 (1965). See also Heck's, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 760 (1966);
J. C. Penney, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 279 (1966).
" 103 Heck's Inc 156 N.L.R.B. 760 (1966). The company contended that the
"union's entire card showing should be rejected because it has been 'tainted' by
the participation of the department heads in, the union's organizational campaign.'
Id. at 767. The Board rejected the company s argument by stating,
While it is true that as Respondents assert, that the five regular or acting
department heads, just mentioned, participated in varying degrees in the
Union's campaign to organize Respondents' store, we do not believe in
the circumstances of this case that their involvement was sufficient to
'taint' the unions entire card showing. Id. at 768.
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completely unrealistic.104 The employee usually signs because he
is only too aware that if the union gets into he plant, the combined
power of the supervisor and the union will be directed toward his
job security if he refuses to sign. This functional approach of in-
herent coercion is being resisted by the Board but it is supported
at least in part by some trial examiners. As yet the Board has not
adopted this realistic approach, looking to the effect of the solicita-
tion on the minds of the employees and invalidating a card if the
employees regarded the solicitor as a supervisor whether he was
one in fact or not. Purity Food Stores, Inc. 0 5 indicates at least that
the Board has not rejected this approach.
In that case, Silva, a non-supervisory employee, solicited 18
cards, including some from seventeen-year old high school stu-
dents. The company contended that he was a supervisor but the
Board, despite the fact that he wore an "assistant grocery manager"
badge, held that his routine work was more indicative of a lead-
man than a supervisor. The Trial Examiner found that the cards
were tainted because even though Silva was not a supervisor, the
fact that he was so regarded by the employees invalidated the cards
because they were induced to sign by coercion:
In determining whether or not the card majority adduced
by General Counsel was tainted by the inherent coercion of
a supervisory solicitation, it is necessary to consider the em-
ployees themselves since it is their right of free choice which
the Act was designed to protect. As noted, a great many of
the employees in this store were and are teenagers, going to
school and working part-time. What is a 17 year-old school
boy likely to do when the individual wearing a badge "As-
sistant Grocery Manager" and whose orders he has been in-
structed to follow, comes to him and asks him to sign a card.
It appears reasonable to believe that he yields to the request,
particularly if he sees that others are doing as the supervisor
requests. 06
The Board did not explicitly reject the Trial Examiner's
reasoning that the cards would be invalidated if the employees
believed that Silva was a supervisor, but reversed him on a point
of evidence, disagreeing that the employees regarded Silva as a
supervisor. The Board said:
104 See J. C. Penney Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 279 (1966).
'05 150 N.L.R.B. 1523 (1965).
106 Id. at 1532.
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Nor do we find anything in the record to support the Trial
Examiner's finding that 'employees generally had reason to
consider Silva as a supervisor and company agent.' Many em-
ployees testified at the hearing but none of them testified that
he considered Silva to be a supervisor, or that he had been
instructed to follow Silva's direction.... In the light of these
facts, we do not believe that that evidence on the record will
support an inference that the employees looked upon Silva
as a supervisor whose 'instructions they must follow.' 10 7
The Board has also indicated in other cases that the element
of coercion is present when employees think a person is a super-
visor regardless of whether in fact he is one.10 8 The test is how the
employees regard him even if he is not in fact a supervisor.
It is as yet unclear what test the Board will adopt in super-
visory solicitation of cards, the conceptual or the functional one.10 9
107 Id. at 1525.108 American Cable Systems, 161 N.L.R.B. 332 (1966); Bauer Welding &
Metal Fabricators, Inc. 154 N.L.R.B. 954 (1965). American Cable Systems is
confusing. The Board feld that cards, solicited by an employee who in fact was
not a supervisor but whom the company maintained was regarded by the
employees as a supervisor should be counted toward a majority because "neither
two was coerced into signing because he felt Cook was a supervisor." 161
N.L.R.B. at 339. Is the Board saying that it intends to apply a cause and effect
test, that the company must prove that the employees signed from fear of super-
visor status, or is it saying that employee cards would be invalid if they regarded
Cook to be a supervisor?10D Recent cases indicate some hope, though the point is still vague . In J. C.
Penney Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 279 (1966) a supervisor Cox, participated in the
unions organizational campaign although technicaly he did not personally
solicit any cards. The Board held that his general participation was sufficient
to taint all the cards. The trail examiner said:
On the record as a whole I cannot agree that Cox's activities were
minimal or that they can be regarded as having had no coercive effect
upon the employees. His participation in the discussion with the union
representatives at the Old South Restaurant at noon on December 18,
when French and Lamke signed union authorization cards; and his
further participation that day at the Blue Bonnet Cafe, when five of the
employees signed authorization cards in his presence after they had been
advised to do so by him; his advice and statements to employees Santone,
Crank, Ickes and Samples, concerning such cards when they asked him
what they should do; and his action in openly permitting Lamke to
call in the employees individually during the afternoon of December
18 for the purpose of signing such authorization cards lead to the con-
clusion that the union's majority was secured with his direct and open
assistance. Accordingly, I find that the union's designation cards signed
by the warehouse employees on December 18 did not constitute a valid
showing that a majority of such employees had designated the union to
represent them at that time. Id. at 286.
See also the recent case of Lamar Elec. Membership Corp., 164 N.L.R.B.
No. 12 (1961) where the employer refused to bargain with a newly certified
union because his supervisor substantially aided the union's organizational cam-
paign. When the employer became aware of the supervisor's activities, on the
(Continued on next page)
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It is to be hoped, however, in the interest of industrial realities that
it will hold that supervisory solicitation of union cards is in-
herently coercive, constituting a per se invalidation of the cards.
3. Authorization Cards and the Trial-If an employer is to pre-
vail in a Bernel Foam case and escape from an 8 (a) (5) or an
8 (a) (1) bargaining order, he must conclusively demonstrate to
the Board that the union never had a majority of the uncoerced
employees. The key phrase is majority of uncoerced employees,
and the employer must attack the entire shaky foundation of the
authorization card process. The Board, however, through built-in
procedures, prevents these cards from being substantially attacked.
Anyone who attempts to do so will run into the "card protectors"
-the Jencks"10 and Taitell" rules. These rules are designed to pre-
vent the employer from attacking the authenticity of the cards.
The NLRB is an agency which combines both the fact-finding
and prosecution functions. In investigating a charge, the field at-
torney takes affidavits and statements from witnesses for both
parties, the company and the union. If the Board decides to issue
a charge against the company, the government enjoys a tre-
mendous advantage because the field attorney who previously
functioned in the role of a fact-finder now functions in the role
of a prosecuting attorney with intimate knowledge of the company's
case while the company is relatively unfamiliar with the union's
case. The employer has no right to the benefits of discovery. He
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
day before the election, he notified the Regional Director that he would refuse
to participate in the election. The Regional Director overruled the employer's
objections to the election without a hearing. The Board held the employer guilty
of an unfair labor practice when he refused to bargain. NLRB v. Lamar Elec.
Membership Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 582 (1964), but the Fifth Circuit refused to
enforce the Board's order and remanded the case to the Board, which proceeded
to dismiss the complaint and set the election aside. NLRB v. Lamar Elea.
Membership Corp., 362 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1966).
In A.T.I. Warehouse, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1968), a case in which
this writer participated, the Board said: ". . . the cards solicited by him [the
supervisor] could not be counted toward the Union's majority when it requested
recognition. . . . It is well settled that cards obtained with "he direct and open
assistance of a supervisor are invalid for such purposes." This statement by the
Board, however, in the writer's opinion does not settle the issue, for in this case
the supervisor directly solicited cards from high school boys thereby creating
a presumption of coercion. The General Counsel made no attempt to rebutt
this presumption.
l10 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In this connection, see also
Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700 (1958).
111I. Taitel and Son., 119 N.L.R.B. 910 (1951), enforced, 261 F.2d I (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944 (1959).
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has no legal right to view any pre-hearing affidavit or statement be-
fore trial or before the General Counsel's direct examination. The
first and only time, according to the rule, when he may request to
see the pre-trial statement of General Counsel's witnesses is after
direct examination and prior to his cross-examination.
Even this privilege of enlightenment under the Jencks rule
is not very meaningful, for it only applies to a witness who has
personally appeared to authenticate his card. In the matter of
authorization cards, the Board had held that "the best evidence
rule" does not require signatories to testify in connection with the
signing of their cards.112 This has been interpreted to mean that
anyone, usually the union solicitor, may testify who saw the em-
ployee sign in his presence. In such a situation, when a union
organizer authenticates the cards of absent signers, the employer
cannot invoke his privilege under the Jencks rule because he is
entitled only to the statements of testifying witnessess.
The ghostly nature of these cards becomes even more apparent
under the Taitel rule. The Board has stretched its rules of
authentication to validate cards signed in the presence of no one
but which are simply in the possession of the union. It has held
that cards will be admitted into evidence, even though they are not
authenticated by the signer or by anyone who saw him sign, simply
on the testimony of a union agent that they have been received by
him in the regular course of union business from keymen in the
unit. The burden of proof is upon the employer to invalidate the
signatures; no opportunity is given him to prove coercion from
the nature of the solicitor's remarks, yet a Trial Examiner has
said, "the Taitel rule contains all the reasonably necessary safe-
guards to employers for due process. . . Common experience
indicates that signature forgery is the exception rather than the
rule."113
The Board tolerates a very loose procedure not only in the
acquisition and admission of cards but also in their completion.
It is common practice for union organizers to obtain only the
signatures of the employee leaving the rest of the card incomplete,
including the most important item-the date. It is a curious
112 Lifetime Door Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 13, 21 (1966).
113 Henry Colder Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (1967) (Statement by Trial
Examiner Maurice S. Bush in his supplementary decision to the NLRB defending
the Taitel rule.)
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anomaly of Board procedure that while undated cards are discard-
ed in support of a showing in representative cases, they are con-
sidered valid in an unfair labor practice proceeding if the date
can be established through evidence. The presumption concerning
undated cards is that they are valid, signed before the union made
its demand or the employer refused the demand. In Midwestern
Mfg. Co.," 4 the General Counsel argued that an employee's card
should count toward the majority, even though the employee
could not remember the date on which he signed it-"It was hot
during the summertime."" 5 The Trial Examiner rejected the card
for the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the card was
signed before October, when the union made its demand. The
Board curtly reversed him by saying, "It is common knowledge
that it is far more likely to be hot in Oklahoma before October
than after that date."" 16
The Board's loose procedures on incomplete cards encourage
forgery on a highly important item which can spell the difference
between victory and defeat-the date. It is a very simple matter
for a union, having undated cards within its possession, acquired
from employees after union demand and hence invalid, to insert
prior demand and refusal dates and hence validate the cards. It
is inexcusable for the Board to honor these cards. To insure the
validity of the election process, an administrative ruling should
require tha all cards in the union's possession before demand bear
the NLRB stamp.
In those rare instances when the Board finds coercion or mis-
representation in the solicitation of cards, it confines itself to the
invalidation of single cards, refusing to find a pattern of coercion
concerning the rest of the cards. This may result in a situation
where the signatures of present coerced signatories do not count
but the signatures of absent signatories in the same environment
do count. In Golub Corporation,"7 many employees testified that
the solicitor violated the Cumberland rule by stating that the cards
were to be used "solely" for an election, yet the Board said the
"cards of employees who did not appear to testify are counted since
there is no showing that the union engaged in an invariable pat-
"14158 N.L.R.B. 1968 (1966).
115 Id. at 1699.
116 Id. at 1700.
"17 159 N.L.R.B. 355 (1966).
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tern of misrepresentation in obtaining signatures.' 1 8 A com-
mentator has also criticized this practice by the Board.
On some occasions, invalidation of all cards obtained by a
particular solicitor or obtained on a particular form of card,
or secured following a particular letter found to misrepresent
the impact of the cards, is warranted. More broadly, the
Board should be less intent on a card-by-card adjudication
of union guilt or innocence and more concerned with an
overall evaluation of the atmosphere in which employees were
asked to register their choice." 9
4. Revocation of Authorization Cards-In theory, the Board
permits an employee to revoke his card at any time before the
employer's refusal to recognize the union. After the refusal data,
however, an employee has no power to revoke the card. In South-
land Paint Company,20 the Board said:
Nor is it of any consequence that some of the employees
sought to revoke their authorization cards on April 17. The
fact as to whether an employer entertains a genuine doubt
that a union represents a majority of the employees is to be
determined as of the time the employer refused to recognize
the union. Once it is shown that the employer entertained no
genuine doubt of the kind at the time it refused to bargain,
an unfair labor practice has been established. The fact that
it later developed there were grounds that might have created
doubt at the time is immaterial.' 21
The actual revocation of the card even before refusal, however,
is another matter. Even though the courts have said that a card
may be informally revoked, 22 the Board has insisted upon im-
posing heavy, formal, affirmative duties upon any employee seek-
ing to revoke his card, sacrificing substance and intent, to empty
form. For instance, it appears to be present Board law that an em-
'1s Id. at 866.119 Lesnick, Establisnment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election,
65 MICH. L. REv. 851, 857-58 (1967).
120 Southland Paint Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 22 (1965).
121 Id. at 45.
122 NLRB v. Reeder Motor Co., 202 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1953). The Sixth
Circuit said:
The Board thought it reasonable to require that the withdrawal of author-
ity be evidenced with the degree of formality required to establish the
original designation. We are unable to agree. This would exalt form
over substance and make the interest of the agent of paramount impor-
tance rather than that of his principals. Id. at 804.
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ployee seeking to revoke his card before union demand or company
refusal, must orally inform a union agent or preferably send a
registered letter of revocation to union headquartersA2 3 Com-
munication of his disavowal to the employer has no legal effect.
This doctrine, contrary to the principles of common law agency
which allow a principal to revoke the power of his agent by in-
forming the third party, obviously originated from dictum by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jas. W. Matthews v. NLRB,14
where the court said: "I am unable to see how the letter of with-
drawal can possibly be relevant to the question of the union's
majority status on... the date the union requested recognition,
as a principal's revocation of his agent's authority is ineffective
until communicated to the agent."' 2 5
Although trial examiners are holding that communication of
card revocation to the employer is an ineffective act of revocation,
citing Tinley Parlor Dairy, 6 the Board itself has dodged passing
upon the question although it is adopting the examiners' con-
clusions.
It seems to be an exercise in technicalities for the Board to
say that employees had failed to revoke their cards by formally in-
forming the union when all the employees including the union
solicitors knew that these employees were agents of the company.1 7
It is even more absurd when the Board itself, after finding them
to be company agents, attributing their unfair labor practices to
the company, at the same time finds that the union is their agent
and that their cards count toward the union majority. This
certainly seems to be a case of revocation through employee con-
duct, the knowledge of the revocation coming to the attention of
the union.
In 1941, Justice Goodrich of the Third Circuit warned the
123 Arkansas Grain Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (1967), where the Board
stated:
There was no testimony establishing that copies of the two joint letters
purporting to withdraw the authorization of the seven employees were
mailed to the union or its agent, and there was no testimony or admission
that the union or its agent received either letter. In these circumstances
I cannot presume that the union was notified or on notice of these
attempts to withdraw the previously given seven authorizations at the
time of the attempt. Id. at 16.
124 354 F.2d 482 (8th Cir. 1965).
125 Id. at 438.
126 Tinley Park Dairy Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 683 (1963).
n
7 Atlas Engine Works, 163 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1967).
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Board about the danger of indulging in per se rules-in the
irrebuttable presumption that any employer unfair labor practice
caused the employees to revoke their cards. In Ougton v. NLRB 1 28
he said:
There is no competent evidence that the loss in union mem-
bership was influenced by the employer unfair labor practices.
Even if the Board may make the assumption that there is a
causal relationship between unfair labor practices on the part
of the employer and loss in union membership when the un-
fair labor practices are contemporaneously present, certainly
there is no irrebuttable legal presumption of a cause and
effect. We do not see how the testimony of those who perhaps
would testify to the contrary may fairly be rejected.129
The Board, however, throughout the years, has completely
rejected this rebuttable presumption test and has adopted a per
se mechanical approach, invalidating all card revocations occur-
ring after the employer's unfair labor practice, completely dis-
regarding the fact whether it was at all related to the revocation.
The road for the Board has not been easy, however, for the Trial
Examiners, present at the scene and in a much better position to
judge whether the employer's misconduct caused the revocation,
have fought the Board all the way.
In Sullivan Surplus Sales,130 an employee before union demand
and after a slight employer unfair labor practice, told the union
agent that she wanted him to return her card because "her
husband was having a fit."'131 The Trial Examiner found that her
revocation was unrelated to the unfair practice. The Board re-
versed him, saying her card should be counted because of "a direct
causal relationship between respondent's conduct and Kuttner's
request.' 1 32 In Quality Markets, Inc. s33 the Trial Examiner found
that an employee, Vera Vergith, revoked her card before the
union demand "strictly on her own initiative."'134 The evidence,
he pointed out, showed that the employer never interrogated
Vergith. Not so, said the Board: "In the light of the small size of the
unit which comprises 21 employees and the respondent's unlaw-
128 118 F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1940).
129 Id. at 499-500 (dissenting opinion).
130 152 N.L.R.B. 132 (1965).
13, Id. at 158.132 Id. at 135.
183 160 N.L.R.B. 44 (1966).
184 Id. at 46.
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ful conduct designed to coerce employees to withdraw from the
union, we must presume that Vergith's attempted revocation of
her card was the result of the respondent's unlawful conduct."'' 35
The Board's skeptical attitude toward card revocation can best
be summed up in the Tinley Park Dairy3 6 and Idaho Egg Pro-
ducers'37 decisions. In Tinley Park Dairy, an employee, Betty
Villa, after signing a union card, told her husband the next day
that she regietted it, and on the following day, before any union
demand upon the company, told the store manager about the
union meeting and about signing the card. Several months later
she sent a letter of revocation to the union. The Trial Examiner
found that Villa's "action in notifying Suhs of her signing with
the union together with her announced decision to her husband to
stay out of the union, constituted a revocation of her designation
which dissipated the union's majority."'13
The Board, holding that communication of revocation to her
husband was legally ineffective dodged the question of whether
communication to the employer was effective by concluding that
she had no intent to revoke because she did not use the word
"regret" to the employer. "As Villa did not tell Suhs that she
regretted having signed a card, but only told him that she had
signed one, there is nothing in this aspect of her conduct that
warrants the Trial Examiner's conclusion as to revocation."' 39
This is indeed very technical language which exalts ritual over
intent, especially in view of the fact that as the employer com-
135Id. See aiso Werstein Uniform Shirt Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 856 (1966),
where again the Board reversed the Trial Examiner stating:
... although the Trial Examiner found that the illegal interrogations by
Leah Werstein involved 'perhaps no more than 3 or 4 employees and that
there was no evidence indicating that Anna Kempf was directly affected
by the illegal conduct,' we are persuaded on the basis of the entire
record, that during the period in question to Anna Kempf revoking
her authorization card, Leah Werstein primarily and Emil Dohen asked
many of the employees including almost all of the females whether they
signed authorization cards. ... Thus we conclude in view of the relatively
small size of the unit which is composed of 23 employees and the evi-
dence of this extensive coercive conduct by the respondent, that the
revocation must be presumed to be the result of respondents unlawful
conduct and that but for such conduct the union would have maintained
the majority status which the parties agree the union had originally
achieved. Id. at 859-60.
136 142 N.L.R.B. 6883 (1963).
137 111 N.L.R.B. 93 (1955).
138 142 N.L.R.B. 683, 686 n.116.
139 Id. at 686 n.124,
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mitted some unfair labor practices after Villa's confession to her
supervisor, the Board concluded that her letter of revocation to
the union was ineffective because it had been caused by the un-
fair labor practices.
In Idaho Egg Producers,40 employee Panter, after signing a
card told her employer the next day before any union demand
that she regretted her act. She did not inform the union, however,
until about a week later, after the employer committed some un-
fair labor practices. The Board, while not saying that revocation
to the company was ineffective, said that she had no intention to
leave the union because she had not acted immediately in in-
forming it.
Her conduct is more impressive and is of more substance than
her statement to Slayden on September 28, that she was sorry
that she had signed a card because despite his reply that she
could withdraw or stay in, as she chose, she patently pre-
ferred to keep the status quo, namely to stay in. I find that
Panter's card should properly be counted as evidence of the
union majority.'4 '
It must be obvious, even to the Board, that employees unini-
tiated in the legal complexities of labor law are completely un-
aware of the fact that they can even revoke a card, much less of
the technical formal requirements for revocation. It is quite
obvious in both of these cases that the employees intended to
revoke their cards for personal reasons, not because of the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. The "but for" rule, that the em-
ployee would not have revoked his card but for the employer's un-
fair labor practice, should be re-examined in the light of in-
dustrial realities and in the name of common sense. It is apparent
from these illustrations that the Board is employing a double
standard in applying common law rules of agency-using agency
as a tool of immunity for unions and as a tool of liability for em-
ployers. An employer is responsible for the misconduct of his
supervisors even though they disobey his express instructions
unless he disavows their acts by applying sanctions. A union is
not responsible for the acts of card solicitors because they have
no "actual" authority and when a union member disobeys the in-
140 111 N.L.R.B. 93 (1955).
141 Id. at 106-07.
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structions of his union, a simple act of disavowal is sufficient-the
application of sanctions is not required.142 An employee, as princi-
pal, cannot revoke his card through any of the common law
principles of agency. At the present time the Board is developing
the alarming doctrine based on agency that an employee may
conditionally revoke his card and later ratify it by his conduct.
These recent doctrines stretching the rules of agency to their
furthest extent to validate cards-trust, bailment, etc.,-serve to
make the entire card process rather ludicrous and only encourage
congressional legislation.143 Also, if an employer in any way as-
sists in the formulation of a letter of withdrawal to the union,
even though requested to do so by the employee, the Board is
inclined to hold the letter of revocation ineffective, regarding the
employer as the principal and the employee as the agent.
B. The Affirmative Duty Of The Union To Give A
Clear and Unequivocal Demand
The second affirmative duty on the part of the union is to
make a clear and unequivocal demand to bargain collectively with
the company. The United States Supreme Court has said that a
142 See Aff'ldt, The Independent Labor Union and The Good Life, 35 C o.
WASH. L. REV. 869 (1967).143 A recent case, A.T.L Warehouse, Inc., v. Teamsters Local 20, 169
N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1968), litigated before Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel, is
a good illustration in point. This was a Bernel Foam case in which the writer
appeared as counsel For the respondent company. The Eighth Region, after
informing me by telephone that no 8(a) (5) complaint would issue because
the union never obtained the majority of the authorization cards, issued a com-
plaint about a week later on the tenuous ground that an employee never
effectively revoked his card. This employee, after signing an authorization card
and prior to any union demand upon the company, asked the union agent to
"return his card or destroy it." The union solicitor, or so it was alleged, asked
the employee if he could keep the card until "the employee heard the union's
side of the story." He said the employee agreed to this. At the first union meeting,
a month after the union demand, it was alleged that the employee said "he was
for the union." The Regional Director, although there was no legal precedent
for this type of transaction, obviously viewing it as a bailment, a trust, or a
ratificption of an agency relationship, issued an 8(a) (5) complaint.
This is dangerous business, applying common law doctrines, designed for
interactions of citizens, to employees within a statutorily defined arena. The
statutory policy here should be the Section 7 right of freedom of choice, favoring
employee revocation. The presumption, estecially after the union has possession
of a card. should be against the union. Under no circumstances after an employee
has asked for the return of his card. should the union be in a position to impose
conditions upon its return. Under this new Board "freeze" doctrine, it would be
almost impossible to invaiidate a card. Also, the Board is applying a double
standard refusing to permit evidence to vitiate a card when an emplovee signs
it but nermitting evidence of intent when he attempts to revoke it. If the union
feels tlfat the employee has changed his mind about the union, the duty at least
(Continued on next page)
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demand is a condition precedent to any finding of a refusal to
bargain: "An employer cannot be found to have refused to
bargain collectively with a representative of an appropriate unit
until the representative has first sought or indicated a desire to bar-
gain for that unit."1 44
"No special formulas or form of words need be employed,"'145
but it is necessary for an 8 (a) (5) violation that there "be an ex-
press request to bargain by the union and a refusal by the em-
ployer."1 48 This is no mere technicality, as the Supreme Court and
early Board decisions have pointed out, but an affirmative duty
of the highest policy dimensions because it provides the employer
with knowledge of the majority's desires without which recogni-
tion would involve a violation of the employee's Section 7 rights-
the heart of the Act.
Unfortunately, over the past few years, the Board, by whittling
away at this doctrine through legal fictions-such as constructive
demand, implied demand, continuing demand, futility, informal
demand, clarifying demand-has reduced it to a meaningless
technicality which is not even necessary under 8 (a) (1) bargaining
orders.
It is black letter law that a union must have a majority of the
authorization cards when it makes its demand to bargain upon
the employer-for if it does not have a majority of the cards on
the date of demand, the employer is under no duty to bargain.
Under the continuing demand doctrine, however, if the union, not
having a majority on the date of its demand, eventually picks up
a majority before company refusal to recognize it, no new and
separate demand is necessary since the unit is not frozen until
the date of the employer's refusal to bargain. 147 For instance, if a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
should be placed upon the union of securing another card.
The Board in A.T.L Warehouse, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1968) refused
to face this issue. It stated that even if the employee ratified his card thereby
giving the union a bare majority, an 8(a)(5) bargaining order would not be
appropriate because the union failed to make a subsequent demand upon the
employer.
.44NLRB v. Columbian Enameling Co., 306 U.S. 292, 297 (1939).
14 5 joy Silk Mills v. NLRB, 185 F.2d. 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951).
146 NLRB v. Burton Dixie Corp., 210 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1954).
147 In Henry Colder Co., 163 NLRB No. 13 (1967), the Board said:
General Counsel's position is reiterated in his brief as follows: 'with
respect to Starks' card, while it was executed on Oct. 14 one day subse-
(Continued on next page)
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union made its request to bargain with a company on June 1,
having only 13 out of 29 cards, less than a majority, and the em-
ployer immediately refused recognition, then the union, when it
picks up its majority in the future, would be obligated to make a
new and separate demand in order to acquile an 8 (a) (5) bargain-
ing order. But in this case, if the employer did not immediately re-
fuse to bargain but instead waited until June 3 to refuse, and
between June I and June 3 the union picked up three extra cards
giving it a majority, the employer would be obligated to bargain
under the continuing demand theory. Of course, if the union
loses any cards through revocation, the same principles apply-
these cards would not count toward its majority.148
It is difficult to quarrel with the logic of the continuing de-
mand doctrine but the Board has gone much further. Under its
"futility" doctrine, it now holds that an ineffective demand made
by a minority union continues beyond the date of the employer's
refusal to bargain, extending to the date the union eventually
acquires its majority. A new and separate demand is excused on
the basis that the employer's attitude and disposition toward col-
lective bargaining-his bad faith-has made it obvious that a new
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
quent to the second demand for recognition and bargaining by the union
it should be counted. The last date for determining the union's majority
status should be the date of the company's refusal to bargain viz., Oct.
19. Thus as Starks' card was executed prior to the company's refusal her
card is countable.
* 4 0 *
General Counsel cites Cuffman Lumber Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. at 319 in
support of his position. In that matter the union demanded recognition
on July 19, 1946 and the employer refused recognition some 14 days later
on Aug. 3. The decision determined the union's majority question on the
basis of the number of cards in the possession of the union as of Aug. 3
and not July 19 when the demand for recognition was made. It can be
deduced in that case that the demand therein was deemed a continuing
demand subject to a card count as of the date of the employer's response
to the demand. Cf. Local No. 152 v. NLRB, 343 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). On the authority of the Cuffrman case and the rationale of
Local 152, the Trial Examiner finds and concludes that Elizabeth Starks'
card of Oct. 14 is countable in determining the union's majority status.
Id.
After the date of the employer's refusal, a new and separate demand must
be made. In NLRB v. Scott & Scott, 245 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1957), the Ninth
Circuit said: "At the time of the demand therefore there was no legal necessity
for the employer to bargain. The union did not represent a majority of the
non-supervisory employees." Id. at 928. The court said that a new and separate
demand was necessary.
148 Henry Colder Co., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (1967).
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demand would be useless and vain. At the time the union
acquires its secret majority, an automatic duty to bargain arises
upon the employer's part regardless of his awareness of knowledge
of the majority.149
The Board's new futility doctrine renders the necessity of a
majority union to make a clear and unequivocal demand to bar-
gain a historic relic. Instead of the union at the time of its initial
demand having the affirmative duty to inform the company that
it has a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit and
that it desires to bargain, the affirmative duty is cast upon the em-
ployer to inform the union that it has supportable reasons for
doubting its majority status. If the company fails to convey sup-
portable reasons, even though the union at the time of its demand
had only a minority, the Board will excuse a new and separate de-
mand on the union's part because of the futility of making a new
demand. This is a dangerous doctrine, in fact, a trap for the em-
ployer in view of the Aaron Bros. and John Serpa decisions.
These cases seem to say that an employer need not convey his
reasons for refusal but if he does not, the Board will seize upon
his silence as a conclusive indicia of continuing bad faith.
This futility doctrine had its origin in Wafford Cabinet Co.,150
where the Board said: "It is now well established that, absent
special circumstances not present here, a prerequisite to a finding
of a refusal to bargain by an employer is a clear and unequivocal
demand for bargaining by the union."'51 In Burton-Dixie,152 the
case that triggered the futility doctrine, the Tenth Circuit defined
as one of the "special circumstances," an employer's intractable
intention not to bargain when he ordered the union agent off
the premises.
There was, however, no express request to bargain, but it
was clearly implied that such a request would follow recogni-
tion of the union, and we think the statements made by Sevic
to Bailey fairly construed, amounted in substance and effect
to an affirmative statement that respondent would not bargain
'49Arkansas Grain Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 92 (1967); J. C. Penney Co.,
160 N.L.R.B. 279 (1966); Wausau Steel Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 635 (1966), en-forced, 377 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1966); American Compressed Steel Corp., 146
N.L.R.B. 1463 (1964); NLRB v. Burton Dixie Corp., 210 F.2d 199 (10th Cir.
1954).
150 95 N.L.R.B. 1407 (1951).
151 Id. at 1408.
152 NLRB v. Burton Dixie Corp., 210 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1954).
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or otherwise deal with the union as the representative of its
employees. Clearly, from statements to Bailey, a request by
Bailey that respondent bargain with the union as the repre-
sentative of the employees, would have been utterly vain
and useless and a mere formality.153
The Board, however, in its recent rash of futility cases does not
rely upon what the employer says but upon what he does not say
in formulating its definition of futility. In American Compressed
Steel Corporation,154 the union, without a majority, made its de-
mand on April 18. It picked up a majority on April 25, but made
no further demand for bargaining. At the time of the initial de-
mand, the employer failed to inform the union that he refused
recognition because it had not obtained a majority. The Board
said -
The company's refusal to bargain, however, was not based on
the fact that the union held only 26 cards on April 18, but
rather on an outright rejection of the union's request without
regard to the number of cards held. In the light of this re-
fusal, it would have been futile for the union formally to re-
new its request after April 25.'55
A union demand to bargain need not be direct or express;
it may be indirect and implied. Such conduct as a strike vote
and picketing constitutes a sufficient demand. 56 Also, demand
may take place anywhere, in the employer's office or at lunch.157
The Board early in its history, held firmly to the proposition
that a demand must be clear and unconditional, and that any
ambiguity would be resolved against the union.
153 Id. at 201.
154 146 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1964).
155 Id. at 1470.156 Scobell Chemical Co. v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1959). The
court said:
Even assuming that the union did not represent a majority of the em-
ployees in the unit at the moment of the express request to bargain, there
can be no doubt that it represented a majority the next day, at the time
of the strike and picketing. The strike and the picket line in the circum-
stances here presented cannot be considered to be anything less than a
continuing demand for recognition and bargaining. Id. at 925.
But see Grain Millers v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1952), where the court
rejected the union's theory of a continuing request: "the unions theory of a
continuing obligation to bargain, which, without request, renewed itself each day
after the first refusal, that, in short, the first refusal created and set in motion a
continuing tort, therefore, will not do." Id. at 454.
157 NLRB v. Scott & Scott, 113 N.L.R.B. 911 (1955), appealed, 245 F.2d
926 (9th Cir. 1957).
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Such a requirement imposes on the union representative
only the obligation to say what he means. Failing to do so,
he cannot be considered as having made the sort of request
to bargain which imposes upon an employer a legal obligation
to comply.158
* a * *
We require no words of art or words without which a re-
quest to bargain is not proper, but only as we have already
emphasized that a labor organization in words of its own
choice clearly communicate to the employer the extent of the
unit employees for which it wishes to bargain. It is not in-
cumbent upon him [the employer] to resolve an ambiguity
in a request to bargain.15 9
There is language in recent decisions indicating that the duty
to resolve ambiguities in a union demand now rests upon the
employer'160 Also, the Board has spawned a new doctrine, com-
parable to the continuing demand, in viewing a petition for an
election as a clarifier of the original demand.' 6 ' In this matter of
ambiguity, however, the courts have refused to permit the Board
to stray very far by insisting that the union communicate its de-
mand in clear language. In Valley Broadcasting Company 62 the
Board attempted to dispense with all the formal requirements of
a demand by stretching agency ratification doctrines out of shape
to reach a policy result, but the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board.
The union in that case made a conditional demand upon the
company, offering it the choice of immediate recognition or an
158 C. L. Bailey Grocery Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 576, 579 (1952).
159 Id. at 580.
160 NLRB v. Scott & Scott, 113 N.L.R.B. 911 (1955). The Board said the
employer raised no question as to the group for which Stausbury presumed tospeak.
61 Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1966).
Although Reed's March 17 letter mentioned only the drivers, by the time
of Thurston's March 29 letter, the petition made it clear that the union
was not seeking a limited unit but claimed to represent all Nashville
terminal employees engaged in driving and dock work. While Thurston's
letter of Oct. 29 challenged the appropriateness of the unit set forth in the
letter, its failure to mention the unit described in the petition makes it
clear that its challenge was technical and did not reflect candid concern
over the scope of the unit the Teamsters claimed to represent. I find that
the request for recognition set forth in the Teamsters March 17 letter, as
clarified by its petition, was sufficient in form as a request for bargaining
and constituted a valid request for bargaining in the appropriate unit.
Id. at 1309.
See also Waukesha Lime and Stone Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 973 (1964).
162 87 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1949), enforced in part, 189 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.
1951).
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election. Realizing that this demand was ineffective, it seized
upon a conversation between the plant manager and an employee
in which the employee advised the manager to talk to the union,
not the employee. The Board held that the union, by filing an
8 (a) (5) unfair labor practice charge, ratified and adopted the em-
ployee's request as its own. The court dismissed the 8 (a) (5)
charge, holding that the union never made any demand upon
the employer.163
Lately, the Board has placed two restrictions upon a demand.
An election petition may act as a clarifier of a previous demand
but it cannot serve as an original demand since it constitutes a
demand to recognize and not a demand to bargain. 6 4 Also, it has
held that a demand made by a union agent during a meeting held
for the purpose of arranging for an election was not a legal de-
mand.
It is clear that the parties were meeting on that day solely
for the purpose of discussing details for an election, the course
of which they already decided as a means for fully resolving
the union's representation claim. We hold that there was no
justification for the Examiner's conclusion of an 8(a)(5)
violation.16 5
C. The Affirmative Duty of the Union to have an
Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Perhaps, with an exception of the Board's authorization card
policy, there is no other field of labor law in which the Board has
163 Id.
164 See Western Aluminum of Oregon, 144 N.L.R.B. 1191 (1963), where
the Board said:
In the instant case the only steps taken by the union looking toward
bargaining was the filing of a petition. Can it be said without any further
action on the part of the union to bargain, a request and refusal will be
inferred from the filing of a petition and subsequent unfair labor practices
by the respondent in violation of 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act
designed to defeat the union's majority representation. In my opinion
the answer is no. There was nothing in these circumstances to indicate
that the union was prepared to negotiate a contract and desired to do so
at the time the respondents committed their unlawful acts. Certainly the
union should have exhibited this much interest before the legal duty to
bargain would attach to the respondent. . . . Although the filing of a
petition for certification may suffice as a request for recognition in order
to raise a question concerning representation, it does not suffice as a
request to bargain, an essential element to an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 1202.165 J. J. Newberry Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1526, 1529 (1965).
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been so bitterly criticized for its lack of policy and its ad hoc
decisions as in its determination of appropriate bargaining units. 166
In a real sense, however, these are not separate problems but two
aspects of the same problem. The Board has been accused by the
courts and commentators of lacking objective criteria, of ignoring
employee Section 7 rights, and of furthering the organizational
activities of unions.
The unit decisions consistently encourage the growth of
unionism as such, rather than protect the rights of em-
ployees.'67
0 * * *
[T]he Board's increasing reliance on this factor [the ex-
tent of union organization] manifests a policy that whatever
is good for the growth of organized labor is good for the
country.168
In any event, it seems that the Board has revolutionized its
concept of what constitutes an appropriate unit. No longer does
the union possess the affirmative duty of making a demand based
upon its majority with "the" appropriate unit. Today it can
carve out "an" appropriate unit from the optimum or "most" ap-
propriate unit.1 9 This policy, of course, works hand in hand with
the card authorization process, for it is a much simpler matter for
the union to obtain cards from a majority within a small unit
and then work outward to organize the entire plant than to ob-
tain cards from the majority of the entire unit and then work in-
ward. Once again through its change of procedural requirements,
the Board has relaxed the affirmative duties of the union in ob-
taining a majority with an appropriate unit.
166 See Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between
Stable Labor Relations and Employees Free Choice, 18 W. RE-s. L. REv. 479(1967).167K. MCGnmss, THE NEw FRONTIn NLRB 97 (1963).
168 Rains Determination of the Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the NLRB:
A Lack of Objectivity Perceived, 8 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 175 (1967). Mr.
Rains also makes the point that "in making this important determination, the
Board has frequently allowed one factor to become controlling; that factor is
the extent to which the members of the unit requested and other potential units
have been organized." Id. at 176.169 Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 825 (1964). The Board said:
It has been our declared policy to consider only -whether the requested
unit is an appropriate one even though it may not be the optimum or
most appropriate unit for collective bargaining. We are convinced that
such a policy is compatible with the objectives of the Act which seeks
to encourage rather than impede the collective bargaining process. Id.
at 828.
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The policy of the Act demands a strong affirmative duty upon
the union to define accurately the scope of the bargaining unit
in which it claims a majority and for which it demands bargaining
rights. If the bargaining unit is defined vaguely or incorrectly,
the employer risks an 8 (a) (2) unfair labor practice charge by
recognizing a minority union. Also, and more importantly, em-
ployee Section 7 rights are violated. No employer should be placed
in such jeopardy that one part of the Act pulls him in one
direction-recognition, while the other part of the Act pulls him
in the other direction-refusal. The duty of adequately defining
the appropriate unit should be placed where it belongs-on the
union.
The Board, at least until recently, followed the policy of com-
pelling the union to define, at least substantially, the bargaining
unit. "Once having defined the unit it claims to represent and
having made a bargaining demand on that basis, the union there-
by established the frame of reference for measuring the validity
of its demand."i17
In holding the union to a high standard of properly defining
the unit, the Board held that when a union made a demand to
bargain for "all your employees," meaning only his mix and
truck drivers, the demand was ineffectual.iY1 It held that the
standard was employer confusion, not union intent, 7 2 and that
intentional exclusion of fringe groups even though they might
be part of the appropriate unit, constituted a substantial variance
because of the confusion it created in the employer's mind.173
In the past few years, however, the trend has swung in the
opposite direction. No longer will an employer be considered as
acting in good faith if he honestly doubts the union's bargaining
i1o Sportwear Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 758, 760-61 (1964).
171 Parker Bros. & Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 872, 876 (1952).
i72Mike Persia Chevrolet Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 877 (1958). The Board said:
The Respondent was justifiably confused as to the scope of the unit
requested by the Union and that, in such a situation, it was not incum-
bent upon the Respondent to seek clarification from the Union in the
matter. Id. at 380.
t 73E. R. Goddard & Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 849 (1953). The Board found
that:
*. . the unit requested by the union, excluding as it does, mechanics
employed in the service department is inappropriate and that only a
unit including the service department mechanics is appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining. As the union never requested the
respondent to recognize it in the unit which we find to be appropriate
and at no time represented a majority tf employees. .. . Id. at 857.
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unit, even though the Regional Director confirms his doubts by
certain inclusions or exclusions. These additions or subtractions
will not be regarded as a "substantial variance" from the union's
original claim unless it destroys the union's majority, for the
Board has said that a reasonable, though mistaken doubt, is not the
equivalent of a good faith doubt.174 The Board has held that any
variance between the union's proposed request and that unit
ultimately found appropriate by the Regional Director, be re-
solved in the union's favor under a doctrine of implied intent-
that the union intended to include all fringe categories falling
under its claim to jurisdiction. When the union claims too little,
the Board's inclusions usually do not change "the essential nature
of the unit"; when the union claims too much, the Board's ex-
clusions usually do not affect the legality of its demand. When
the union intentionally excludes certain categories, making im-
possible the application of the implied intent rule, the Board
finds that "the variance between the unit requested and the ap-
propriate unit is not so substantial as to vitiate the bargaining de-
mand or to excuse the duty to bargain."'1 75
It is obvious here that the Board has abandoned a functional
approach, looking to the effect of the demand by the incorrect
bargaining unit upon the employer to determine whether he was
confused by the demand. Instead, it looks to the intent of the
union and expands the express intent to the implied intent. The
important policy values of the employer duty not to recognize a
minority union-which is a very real possibility when a union
imprecisely defines the bargaining unit-and the strong tendency
to interfere with employee rights to refrain from union activities,
are completely ignored. The Board has forgotten what the
Supreme Court said some years ago. "It is difficult to see how
the refusal of the request can be unlawful when granting the same
'74NLBB v. Fosdal, 367 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1966). The court said:
We agree with the Board that adding three employees to the previous
seven was an insubstantial variance. The essential nature of the unit was
not changed. All ten performed substantially similar work and the
majority status of the work was unaffected by changing the unit from
seven to ten, inasmuch as seven employees had validly signed the dual
purpose cards. In these circumstances the company was not excused
from its statutory obligation to bargain with the union. Id. at 787.
See also Dixie Color Printing Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1966); Heck's, Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 760 (1966); Primrose Supermarket, 148 N.L.R.B. 610 (1964).
'75 Priced Less Discount Foods, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1145n.ll (1961).
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request might ultimately result in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding."176
III. SECTION 8 (a) (1), 8 (a) (2) AND 8 (a) (3) BARGAINING ORDERS
An 8 (a) (5) bargaining order, as we have seen, will not be
issued by the Board until a majority union in an appropriate unit
has made a demand to bargain upon the employer. If no demand
is made, the Board, however, may still issue a bargaining order,
not a Section 8(a)(5) but a Section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2) or 8 (a) (3)
bargaining order.
Two conditions can trigger the issuance of such a bar-
gaining order: one, the acquisition of a majority by the union;
and two, an unfair labor practice by the employer. Knowledge of
the union's majority through a union demand is not necessary;
the employer who commits an unfair labor practice assumes the
risk that a majority might exist. It is not a matter of knowledge
but a matter of strict liability-cause and effect. The Board's
rationale is that since the union claimed a majority of the em-
ployees within the unit before the employer's unfair labor
practice, the bargaining order simply restores the status quo prior
to the employer's violation.
The Board defends its policy of issuing section 8 (a) (1),
8 (a) (2) and 8 (a) (3) bargaining orders by proclaiming that it
has the sole power to determine the effect of the employer's un-
fair labor practices upon the minds of the employees, whether
the unfair labor practices were substantial or unsubstantial.
There appears to be some authority for the Board's position. In
International Association of Machinists v. NLRB'y7  Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court, said: "It is for the
Board, not the courts, to determine how the effect of prior un-
fair labor practices may be expunged."' 78 Also, Justice Learned
Hand, a vocal exponent of judicial restraint, said. "The Board is
the tribunal to determine the effect of what was done upon the
minds of the employees who were present at those meetings. This
was authoritatively settled in Frank Bros."'7 9
176 International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731,
734 (1961).
177311 U.S. 72 (1940).
178 Id. at 82.
1'9 NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir. 1954).
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It is difficult to accept the Board's rationale. In Frank Bros.80
and the early cases of the thirties and forties, when labor law was
in a relatively unsophisticated stage, the courts endorsed the rare
bargaining orders. However, those were cases of serious and
flagrant 8 (a) (2) (company domination of the union) and
8 (a) (3) (discriminatory discharges) unfair labor practices com-
mitted by employers. They were not cases of "isolated" or
''technical" violations.
Today, the Board is relying upon these early cases of employer
capital economic crimes to justify issuing bargaining orders in
economic misdemeanor cases. It is not at all clear in most Section
8 (a) (1) bargaining order cases whether the unfair labor practice
had any coercive effect upon the employees. The circuit courts, as
will be pointed out, do not feel that the Board should be the sole
arbiter which judges the effect of employer unfair labor practices
upon the employees. Section 10 (c) only gives the Board power to
adopt remedies which effectuate the purpose of the Act. Many
circuit courts feel that issuing bargaining orders based upon slight
or technical unfair labor practices does not effectuate, but in-
stead militates against the purpose of the Act, because it interferes
with the Act's principal purpose-the protection of employees'
Section 7 rights of freedom of choice. 81
It seemed, at least until 1963, the date of the Western
Aluminum 182 decision, that the Board considered Section 8 (a) (1)
bargaining orders an extraordinary remedy. Only a few 8 (a) (3)
bargaining orders had been issued. In Western Aluminum, the
Board found that the union had represented a majority of em-
ployees but that, by discriminatorily discharging an employee,
the employer had dissipated that majority. The Trial Examiner,
finding that he was unable to issue an 8 (a) (5) bargaining order
because the union had not made any demand for recognition
upon the employer, recommended an 8 (a) (3) bargaining order
based upon section 10 (c) of the Act. The Board adopted his
recommendation in an opinion which hinted that henceforth it
would look with favor upon Section 8 (a) (1) , (2) and (3)
bargaining orders:
180 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
181 See, e.g., NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1965).
182144 N.L.R.B. 1191 (1963).
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Where as here the union has clearly established its major-
ity status prior to respondents unfair labor practice and re-
spondents have engaged in unfair labor practices aimed at
destroying the union's majority and disclosed a disposition
to evade their obligation under the Act, we would require
respondents to bargain upon request whether or not the union
lost its majority by a turnover. . . . Indeed, under the cir-
cumstances, it must be presumed that, but for the respondents
unfair labor practices, the union would have retained its
majority.... Not to order the respondents to bargain with the
union upon request would in effect enable the respondents to
profit by their unfair labor practices.183
Delight Bakery, Inc., 18 4 is the classic case which the Board con-
tinues to cite as precedent for issuing 8 (a) (1) bargaining orders.
It is only the second case in the Board's history in which the
Board issued an 8 (a) (1) bargaining order. It is the first case in
the Board's history in which it issued a bargaining order where it
is not all clear whether the employer committed an unfair labor
practice. Even assuming arguendo, that the employer was guilty
of an unfair labor practice, it was at most a slight, technical un-
fair labor practice.
In this case the employer, the owner of a small bakery, was
in serious financial trouble and his employees' morale was at a
low ebb. After the union obtained a majority, he sought a solution
to his financial troubles by hiring a firm of professional con-
sultants. These consultants made a survey and as a result advised
him to hold frequent meetings with his employees. At these
meetings he kept within the law, discussing problems but pro-
mising no benefits to the employees. A committee was formed
for closer communication, whether at the suggestion of the em-
ployer or the employees it is difficult to say from the record. Also,
in accordance with state law, he supplied uniforms to the em-
ployees. The Board found that the company was guilty of unfair
labor practices in promising benefits, forming the committee and
providing the uniforms. It is a very close borderline case in respect
to even the existence of unfair labor practices; it could have gone
either way, depending upon the view of the decision-maker.
183 Id. at 1192.
184 145 N.L.R.B. 893 (1964).
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Relying upon one case, the Board issued an 8 (a) (1) bargaining
order.18 5
On appeal, Justice Edwards of the Sixth Circuit admitted that
it was a borderline case: "The record we have reviewed does not
compel the findings and inferences we have recited. Nor are we
certain that had we heard the witnesses, we would have reached
the same results. Each of the company's acts could have been in-
terpreted differently."'186 Despite his doubt that the employer com-
mitted any unfair labor practices, Justice Edwards affirmed the
Board's order. To the company's contention that an 8 (a) (1)
bargaining order was a "revolutionary" device, completely out of
proportion to the doubtful unfair labor practice, Justice Edwards
insisted that previous court decisions substantiated the order,
citing D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB8 7, Summit Mining Corp. v.
NLPLB,188 and NLRB v. Caldarera.189
There is little doubt that Delight Bakery is "a revolutionary
decision". 190 The cases and the supporting Supreme Court dicta
which the NLRB has been citing to the courts have absolutely no
support for the issuance of 8 (a) (1) bargaining orders. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB;191 NLRB v. Colton;192
NLRB v. Lorillard;193 NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co.;194 and NLRB v.
Armco Drainage9 5 were serious 8 (a) (2) domination cases, not
185 D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950).
186 NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1965).
187 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950).
188 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958).
189 209 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1959).
190 353 F.2d at 347.
191 311 U.S. 72 (1940). In this case an unsophisticated employer refused to
enter into a contract with the U.A.W. which clearly represented a majority of
his employees. He instituted a campaign against the machinists union, dis-
charging twenty toolroom employeez who refused to join the machinists union.192105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939). This is not strictly a first arena case but
a decertification case. Here the employer attempted to disestablish the union
through a campaign of coercion, polls, threats, etc.
193 117 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1941). Here the Sixth Circuit, admitting that the
company was instrumental in dissipating the union's majority through domina-
tion, disagreed with the Board that it was the only cause. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit saying that "this was for the Board to determine
and the court below was in error in modifying the Board's order in this respect."
NLBB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 513 (1942).
194 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954). Justice Learned Hand found a pattern of
employer attempts to dominate the union. "Between Oct. 11 and Oct. 25, it
[the company] held 9 meetings of the separate 'departments that we have
described and it is certainly possible that it was these that lost the Union its
majority." Id. at 905.
I9 220 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955). The employer recommended a company
union.
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8 (a) (1) cases. Texarkana Bus Co. v. NLRB; 196 Hamilton G.
Brown Shoe Co. v. NLRB; 197 Summit Mining Corp.;198 NLPLB v.
Caldarera;199 Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB; 20 0 and Editorial
"EL Imparcial" v. NLRB 20 1 were serious 8 (a) (3) cases, not
8 (a) (1) cases.
There is only one decision before Delight Bakery that has
any possible relevance to an 8 (a) (1) bargaining order and in
that case, D. H. Holmes, the employer initiated a campaign against
the union, committing flagrant unfair labor practices, threatening
to close the bakery in the event the company lost the election,
and granting wage increases and back pay on the day before the
election. 2
02
A few months after the Delight Bakery decision, Trial Ex-
aminer Frederick U. Reel rendered his decision in American Com-
pressed Steel.20 3 In this case the union made its demand upon the
company on April 18 without having a majority. The company
refused to bargain. On April 25 the union obtained a majority,
neglecting, however, to make a new demand upon the company.
196 119 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1941). Here, the employer committed flagrant
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) unfair labor practices. He asked employees to sign
letters disavowing the union, questioned employees about their union affiliation,
and indiscriminately discharged employees.
197104 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1939). This case involved serious 8(a)(2) and
8(a) (3) violations of the Act. The Eighth Circuit refused to enforce a bargaining
order but ordered a return of the status quo by ordering the Board "to determine
the choice of the employees by requiring an election after the status quo shall have
been restored by disestablishing the company union and by the reinstatement of
the wrongfully discharged employees." Id. at 56.198260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958). This is an 8(a)(3) bargaining order case.
The union made a conditional, invalid demand by giving the employer a choice
of a card check or an NLRB election. The Third Circuit upheld the 8(a)(3)
bargaining order, saying "this provision of the order does not depend upon a
previous demand by the union or a refusal by petitioner. It looks to the future
and only in event such request shall be made will petitioner be required to
bargain collectively with the union." Id. at 900.
199 209 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1954). The union here made an ambiguous re-
quest to an uneducated employer by asking him-"care to do business with us?"
The court found the demand legally ineffective but upheld the Board's 8(a) (3)
bargaining order because of the campaign against the union especially the dis-
20arg0 b 280 F.2d 575 (8d Cir. 1960). This case involved the duty of a successor
corporation not to discriminate in its hiring practices against employees because
of their union membership.
201 278 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1960). This is not technically a first arena case
since the union here was already in existence. The company refused to bargai
because the union failed to comply with the filing requirements of Sections g),(f), and (h) of the Act and discriminatorily discharged union adherents. The
court upheld the 8(a) (3) bargaining order.202 D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950).
203 146 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1964).
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During the interval between April 18 and April 25, the company
committed some slight unfair labor practices. Trial Examiner
Reel initiated a double barreled remedy. He recommended an
8 (a) (5) bargaining order based on the futility doctrine because
the company did not give the correct or specific reason for re-
fusing to bargain (the lack of a union majority), thereby implying
that it would not bargain for any reason. He also recommended
an alternative remedy-an 8 (a) (1) bargaining order if the Board
refused to accept his 8 (a) (5) order. "Even if the absence of a
formal request after April 25 were fatal to the claim of refusal to
bargain, an affirmative bargaining order would be appropriate to
remedy the violations found above and to restore the status quo
ante."204 The Board upheld his 8 (a) (1) bargaining order.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals also upheld the right of the Board to issue an 8 (a) (1)
bargaining order. It said,
[A]n order of the NLRB requiring an employer to bargain
with the union upon request in the future is enforceable and
does not depend upon prior violations of section 8(a) (5) of
the Act since the union did not obtain majority status and
such an order is appropriate to remedy section 8(a) (1) and
(3) violations.205
The key word here is "majority." The method by which the
union obtained the majority was not discussed and the court
seemed to imply that the Board was the chief determiner of what
constituted "interference." By placing no duty upon the Board to
give any reason why slight unfair labor practices merited a
bargaining order and effectuated the policies of the Act, the
court rubber-stamped the Board's per se approach-an irrebuttable
presumption that any unfair labor practice dissipated the majority.
Many courts, however, are beginning to have second thoughts
about the Board acting as a sole arbiter in determining the effect
of employer unfair labor practices on the minds of the employees.
In NLRB v. Flomatic Corp.,2o6 the court reversed the Board's
holding that an employer who promised some minor benefits
to his employees during an organizational campaign merited an
204 Id. at 1471.
205 Teamsters Local 152 v. NLRB (American Compressed Steel Corp.), 343
F.2d 307, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
206 8347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
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8 (a) (1) bargaining order. The court found the promises to be
technical violations, but too unsubstantial in nature to warrant
an 8 (a) (1) bargaining order. Justice Hays, in dissent, felt that
the court should not intrude upon the Board's domain in de-
termining the effect of coercion upon employees and how to
remedy it.
The circuits are presently in agreement that the Board has
the power to issue 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3) bargaining orders, but
are divided over the issue of whether the courts have the power
to enforce these orders. Some courts follow Justice Hays' judicial
restraint approach. 207 Others follow Justice Anderson's judicial
activist approach as expressed in the Flomatic majority opinion.208
The judicial restraint opinion is illustrated by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Steelworkers v.
NLRB.20 9 In that case, the court, after admitting that the evidence
of unfair labor practices was "hardly overwhelming," 21 upheld
the Board's 8 (a) (1) bargaining order, saying:
As we have stated, the choice of remedies is primarily
within the province of the Board. The Board has the responsi-
bility for deciding what relief is most 'appropriate' and in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion we will not interfere.
Even where the particular remedy carved out by the Board
has an impact on other values protected by the National
Labor Relations Act, it is the Board that has the primary
duty of reconciling sometime divergent interests.211
The judicial activist approach is illustrated by the Second
Circuit decision in NLRB v. Better Val-U Stores.2 1 2 In that case
the employer committed some unfair labor practices but since the
union failed to make any demand upon the employer to bargain,
the Board could not seek an 8 (a) (5) order. Instead the Board
asked the court to enforce its 8 (a) (1) bargaining order. The court
refused saying that it would only issue an 8 (a) (1) bargaining
order when in its opinion the effect of the employer's unfair labor
207 United Steelworkers v. NLRE, 376 F.2d 770 (D. C. Cir. 1967); Wausau
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1967); J. C. Penny Co. v. NLRB,
884 F.21 479 (10th Cir. 1967).
208 NLRB v. Better Val-U Stores, F.2d (2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Logan
Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967); Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870
(6th Cir. 1968).
209 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
210 Id. at 772.
211 Id. at 773.
212 401 F. 2d. 491 (2d Cir. 1958).
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practices was so grave that it made a free election impossible. It
demanded substantial evidence not only of a "widespread cam-
paign," 213 but also of proof that the company dissipated the union's
majority. The court stated that the issuing of an 8 (a) (1) bargain-
ing order was an extraordinary remedy and should only be issued
"where the employer's conduct has been so flagrantly hostile to
the organizing efforts of a union that a secret election has un-
doubtedly been corrupted as a result of the employer's militant
opposition."214
The trend is definitely toward the activist approach. In NLRB
v. S. E. Nichols Company,2 1 5 the company initiated a campaign
designed to keep the union out of its plant. After union demand,
the Board found that the company gave the impression of union
surveillance, promised economic benefits and threatened to eject
from the store any employee who was found talking to a union
organizer. These were all technical violations, but the court was
not impressed with the intensity of the coercion. Chief Justice
Friendly said:
We suppose the Board was warranted in finding that the
provision of increased benefits violated 8 (a) (1) under NLBB
v. Exchange Parts Co., 875 U.S. 405 (1964), although in con-
trast to the Examiner's portentious description the violation
to our mind comes close to being de minimus.... The two
incidents relied upon to prove that Nichols created an
impression of unlawful surveillance shows little more than it
as some source of information about union activities; there
was nothing to indicate it had stimulated the naming of such
reports .... 
2 16
Finding technical violations of 8 (a) (1), the court proceeded
to dismiss the 8 (a) (5) bargaining order by finding many of the
cards invalid. Chief Justice Friendly also took time out to attack
the Board on its policy of issuing 8 (a) (1) bargaining orders.
"We do not read the Trial Examiner's report which the Board
adopted, as basing the bargaining order on the 8 (a) (1) violations,
and, with these of so low an order of magnitude, we would not
uphold it if in fact it proceeded on that ground.2 17
213 Id. at 495.
214 Id. at 494.
215 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967).
216 Id. at 440.
217 Id. at 441.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This tendency of the Board to impose a bargaining repre-
sentative upon the employer and his employees when it is far
from clear that an uncoerced majority exists, or that the majority
has been influenced or coerced by the employer's unfair practices,
strikes at the heart of the Act-section 7 right of employees to
freedom of choice.218
To obtain a bargaining order the union must possess an un-
coerced majority in the bargaining unit. The possession of the
majority of authorization cards does not mean that the union pos-
sesses an uncoerced majority.21 9 To presume so, as does the Board,
is simply unrealistic. The presumption, since cards lack the safe-
guards of the voting booth, should be that they are invalid and
that it is incumbent upon the union to demonstrate their
authenticity. There should be a presumption that cards solicited
by a supervisor, either actively or passively, are invalid; that in-
formal revocation is valid, when conveyed to an employer; that
during the hearing, it is incumbent upon the signer of the card
to testify or, if he cannot, to submit affidavits, that he voluntarily
signed. The continuing demand and futility doctrines should be
discarded. Also, the same strict rules regarding the acceptance and
218 In W. Fsmunw_, LAw IN A CHANGIm Socmry (1959), the author
states that:
[Fireedom of association must include the freedom not to associate. It
is true, that increasingly agreements made between the major employers
and employees' associations are applied to the whole industry so that even
non-members join in the benefits of such agreements. Graver, however,
than this situation would be the recognition of a genuine principle of
compulsory union membership as a condition of employment. This would
transform democratic industrial society into that of the corporate state.
The practical difference is small for the trend is towards powerful unions
which hardly need coercion. The freedom of the occasional dissenter
makes a difference of principle out of proportion to its economic sig-
nificance. Id. at 501-02.
219 NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 886 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967). The court
here states that signed cards are at most an indication of employees' desires be-
cause the employer does not know how the union obtained them. In Textile
Workers Union v. NLRB (Hercules Packing Co.), 386 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1967),
Justice Friendly said:
Examination of the cards goes only to one element necessary to the
union's majority status. It shows nothing on the equally important factor
of how the cards were obtained. For an employer to say in effect 'I will
concede you may have a majority of signed cards, but I distrust their
validity' is in no way inconsistent with good faith. Id. at 793.
In the recent case of Wilder Mfg. Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1968), the Board
seems to have accepted Justice Friendly's thesis.
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rejection of cards as applied by the Board in representation
elections-the necessity of a date, etc.-should govern in counting
cards toward a majority.
There is substance to the Boards argument that evidence of
the card signer's state of mind when he signed the card should
not be introduced into evidence contradicting the written lan-
guage of the card itself. The period of time between the date of
signing the card and the hearing is too long, thus providing the
employer with ample time to change the minds of many card
signers. The Board should, however, place a much higher duty
upon the solicitor of the cards, compelling him to submit two
cards, one calling for an election and another calling for a vote.
A simple, brief explanation, preferably approved by the Board,
should be attached to each, explaining the consequences of the
act of signing-that it is possible, if the union acquires a
majority, that no election will be held. The judicial standard is
correct and the Board should take the court's suggestion to draw
up such a model card.
The present mechanical approach of the Board, basing bargain-
ing orders upon innocuous unfair labor practices is also alarming
because it betrays an insensitivity to the realities of industrial
life. By viewing any unfair labor practice after the union has ob-
tained an alleged majority of the authorization cards as a capital
economic crime against the employees, making necessary a bargain-
ing order instead of an election, the Board has demonstrated that
it has adopted a conceptual, punitive test. The Board is looking in-
to the mind of the employer for fault as if such fault were a
criminal offense, instead of looking to the effect of the unfair labor
practice upon the mind of the employee, as it should do in finding
a regulatory offense. Per se rules, except at the extremities of a
process where they guard high values, have no place in dynamic
group interactions.
The concept "unfair labor practice" is not a static term; it is
employed to describe a process which may vary from the slightest
to the most intense coercion. It is necessary for the decision-maker
to take into consideration the degrees of coercion, and not to as-
sume that all unfair labor practices have the same effect. Some un-
fair labor practices are inherently coercive, such as most 8 (a) (2)
and 8 (a) (3) practices. If during an organization campaign, the
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employer dissipates the majority by establishing a company union,
he deserves a bargaining order. Also, if he discharges a union
organizer or employee for union activity, it is obvious that he has
intensely coerced the other employees and hence should be ordered
to bargain.
This writer has no quarrel with the Board when it issues
bargaining orders in these serious 8 (a) (2) and 8 (a) (3) cases. It
is only too obvious that the union lost the election or its majority
because of the employer's misconduct. However, this writer does
quarrel with the Board when it mechanically issues bargaining
orders in 8 (a) (1) cases. Most 8 (a) (1) unfair practices, except
when they accumulate as part of an employer's anti-union cam-
paign, are economic misdemeanors and as such the capital punish-
ment of a bargaining order does not fit the crime or effectuate the
purposes of the Act.
There is a tremendous difference between an 8 (a) (1) viola-
tion of forgetting to place a comma or correct word in a no-solici-
tation rule and an 8 (a) (3) violation of discharging a union
organizer. If the Board feels that 8 (a) (1) unfair practices did
have some effect, it could more adequately restore the status quo
by the use of other sanctions more suited to the misconduct, such
as permitting the union to neutralize the employer's conduct by
speaking on the company's premises, fines, etc. More imagina-
tive use of sanctions by the Board would convince many that it
was more interested in remedial rather than in punitive orders.
In brief, both the Board and the courts should bear in mind that
the process of coercion encompasses a wide spectrum and that
many unfair labor practices not only fall on deaf ears but off
smiling lips. 220 If the courts refuse to permit the Board to ex-
periment with imaginative sanctions, and there is evidence that
they are reluctant to do so, they should at least demand that the
Board give supportable reasons for its bargaining order decisions.
An indispensable requirement of due process in western
countries is that the decision-maker give reasons, not only for his
decisions, but for his orders. This the Board has failed to do. This
the court should compel it to do-give reasons and evidence for all
bargaining orders. The assumption indulged in by the courts
22OAffeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4): An Inte-
grated Approach to Labor Law, 54 GEo. L.J. 55, 56 (1965).
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should be that all serious 8 (a) (2) and 8 (a) (3) bargaining orders
are valid, while all 8 (a) (1) bargaining orders are invalid. Only
convincing evidence beyond a reasonable doubt should uphold
even a serious and flagrant 8 (a) (1) bargaining order. Other
sanctions exist to cope with this problem.
The chief reason for the Board's sudden change of policy, be-
sides its desire to penalize employers who interfere with its
election process, is "its insistent refusal to see any social or in-
tellectual connection between one part of the NLRB and its
satellite areas."221 This balkanized approach has caused im-
measurable harm, dislocating vital values which Congress meant
to preserve. The inner logic of the Act demands a recognition of
three related arenas-before, during, and after collective bargain-
ing.
In the second and third arenas, during and after collective
bargaining, where the participants are organized groups (the
corporation and the union) the values are different. In the second
arena-during collective bargaining, both groups have a mutual
obligation to each other to exercise the most intensive effort to
agree upon a contract. In essence, they have a duty to associate,
to sit down and attempt to reach agreement. In the third arena,
once they have signed a contract, both groups have a duty not
to disassociate during the term of the contract because of the high
value of community peace.
This duty to negotiate, to settle differences amicably in the in-
terest of community peace, is not the policy of the first arena-the
organizational stage-since the employee under Section 7 is given
the privilege of refraining from collective bargaining. The social
interest in community industrial peace is subordinated to the
employee's right of freedom of choice. The participants here are
the corporation, the labor union, and the unorganized individual;
the existence of the bargaining group even though supported by
the majority of authorization cards, is highly uncertain-it has not
been certified. To impose the same duties upon an employer in
dealing with a legitimate, certified group as in dealing with a
highly doubtful majority is irrational until a majority within
that group is conclusively and clearly demonstrated. Until that
time the employer has no duty to recognize that group; in fact,
221 Id.
1969]
KENTucY LAw Jomu NA [Vol. 57,
he has the duty to refuse recognition until he is convinced that
it is formed. The affirmative duty to give clear and supportable
reasons for the group's existence should be cast upon the union,
not the employer. Only in this way can the interest of the em-
ployer and the interest of the employees in freedom of association
and freedom of choice be served. The present tendency of the
Board to place the affirmative duties on the employer is simply an
amendment of the Act through administrative decision. 222
Board regulation of campaign tactics during an election,
though well-intentioned, has been recognized by critics and
acknowledged by the Board itself, as ending in failure.223 The
Board feels that the chief cause for its failure is the lack of
adequate sanctions or remedies. It accordingly has seized upon
the remedy of the bargaining order as the final solution to its
troubles. This writer feels, however, that the solution does not
lie here, but rather in the institutional structure of the first arena.
This writer would, therefore, propose a neutrality test, applicable
to both the company and the labor union. Under this theory, the
Board would prevent both groups from interacting with the em-
ployees and discussing any union activities. From the date of
the beginning of the organizational drive, or from the time of
the announcement of the election to the date of the election, a
222 In the first arena the Board's principal function is to act as a "protector"
of the individual's freedom of non-association as well as of association. Its prin-
cipal function in the second arena is not to act as a "protector" but as an 'arbi-
trator" bringing both groups together and, through legal coercion, attempt to
strike a rough balance of power sharing. The collective bargaining process is a
combination of status and contract- status, because both groups as a result of
their social responsibilities have a duty of association; contract, because no gov-
ernmental agency can compel them to agree to the terms of a contract.
In the third arena, after the collective bargaining agreement or treaty has
been signed, the state and federal courts are the principal decision makers. The
function of the courts is to act neither as a protector or "arbitrator," but rather
as a "guardian" of the public interest. Representing the overriding interests of the
state, the social interest in industrial peace, after the community has provided
both parties an opportunity to reach agreement, the courts are enforcers of the
contract, imposing upon each the duty to refrain from disassociation, at least
during the term of the collective agreement.
The NLRB by equating the first and second arenas has confused its function
as a "1protector" with that of an "industrial manager" or "arbitrator." It has sub-
stituted its conception of the industrial public philosophy for that of Congress
and that of the nation.
223 See Hearings on H.R. 11725 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education & Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968); Hearings on
H.R. 667, H.R. 1134, H.R. 1548, H.R. 2038, H.R. 8355, H.R. 4278, & H.R.
6080 Before the Special Subcomm. on NLRB of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion & Labor, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Hearings on Administration of the
Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB Before the Subcomm. on NLRB
of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961).
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Board employee would be present at the plant to enforce this
neutrality theory. Slight infractions could result in fines, revoca-
tion of authorization cards, additional speeches by the harmed
party, etc. In order for the employees to have access to enlighten-
ment, the Board could permit a maximum of three debates be-
tween the parties in a public hall. A possible objection-that this
theory would imperil free speech-has no standing because free
speech does not apply to groups possessing sanctions over their
audience.
The ability of both groups to communicate-to get their mes-
sage across to the employees-would be more than adequately
served through the three debates. This would eliminate encounter
between the group and the single individual which has caused so
much litigation. In adopting this test the Board would bring to a
halt that silly semantic game of distinguishing between persuasion
and coercion which it has played for the last thirty-plus years. This
writer believes that if both parties, the employer and the labor
union, are subscribing in good faith to our national labor policy
which is that persuasion rather than coercion should prevail in the
organizational stage, then this is a more democratic answer than
the Board's final solution.
It is the thesis of this article that the card authorization process
is a perfectly legitimate method of obtaining union recognition,
but that the Board has abused this process by assuming that
solicitor's cards are valid cards. It is recommended that the card
process be regulated, not abandoned. There is alarming evidence,
however, that the courts, disenchanted with the Board's ad-
ministration of the process and unable to regulate it, are begin-
ning to reject the entire process. Instead of finding cards pre-
sumptively unreliable, they are beginning to find cards inherently
unreliable, regardless of the circumstances. 224
224NLBB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967). The
court said:
It would be difficult to imagine a more unreliable method of ascertain-
ing the real wishes of employees than a 'card check' unless it were an
employer's request for an open show of hands. The one is no more re-
liable than the other. No thoughtful person has attributed reliability
to such card checks.... If he has no honest doubt of the union ma-
jority, it will be because of other evidence known to him, not because
of the card check. Id. at 568.
See also General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 898 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1968);
(Continued on next page)
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Legal authority supports the proposition that under Section
8 (a) (5) the employer has the duty to bargain with his employees
once he becomes aware of their majority status. An election is
not a condition precedent to recognition.225 "The duty to bargain
is not dependent upon a Board certification under section
9 (c) .-226 The fact that authorization cards are not "convincing"
evidence of majority support does not militate against the fact
that they are "strong" evidence of majority support. At the very
least, a prima facie case for recognition should be made out when
the union makes a recognition demand upon the employer.227 It
should then be incumbent upon the employer after he has had
time to make a proper investigation to rebut this prima facie
case by demonstrating his good faith by giving at that time
specific supportable reasons for his refusal.
This writer has no complaint with the Board's present policy of
defining employer good faith in narrow objective terms-a material,
substantial doubt grounded upon a factual basis. 22 8 It must be re-
membered here that we are dealing with the duty of collective
bargaining, which goes to the heart of the Act. Certainly, if, as
the Supreme Court recently decided, the employer has the affirma-
tive duty to give not only reasons, but substantial ones, to justify
an 8 (a) (8) allegation,229 highly supportable reasons should be
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co. 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367
(4th Cir. 1967).
225 United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
226 NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551, 554 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Concurring opinion).227 In Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968), the court said
that a prima facie case was not made out.
An allegation on the part of an employer that he possesses a good
faith doubt as to the majority status of a union is not in the nature of an
affinmative defense upon which the employer has the burden of proof.
Rather the burden of proof is on the General Counsel to establish the
bad faith of the employer in refusing to bargain with a union claiming
to represent a majority of his employees.... As the Board admits in its
brief 'this burden is not met simply by showing that the employer has
advanced no reason for his doubt. Merely proving that an employer has
rejected a card check in favor of a board supervised election is not suf-
ficient to negative a good faith doubt. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 876.228 See note 15, supra.
229 In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), the court
said:
And even if the employer does come forward with counter explana-
tion for his conduct in this situation, the Board may nevertheless draw
(Continued on next page)
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demanded on an 8 (a) (5) allegation. Any doubt should not
suffice, but only a substantial objective doubt which the employer
entertained at the time of his refusal to recognize the union. An
honest but mistaken doubt, one that does not affect the majority
status of the union, should not be considered good faith.
There is a trend upon the part of the courts to subvert the
entire structure of the card authorization process by expanding
the "good faith" concept to such an extent that it is becoming
meaningless. They have re-defined "good faith" in terms of an
"honest doubt," not a material factual doubt.2 30 The result is that
the entire card process is threatened with extinction since it
taxes the imagination how even the most unsophisticated employer
could not claim good faith under this definition. He would always
entertain some doubt about some aspects of the card process. This
judicial approach combined with its propensity to view 8 (a) (1),
(2) and (3) bargaining orders as extraordinary remedies signals
the death of all bargaining orders under Section 10 (c).
The Fourth Circuit has directly repudiated the authenticity
of authorization cards.231 Because of their inherently invalid na-
ture, this Circuit holds that an employer has no duty to justify
his good faith by giving any reason for rejecting them. The
Second and Sixth Circuits reach the same conclusion indirectly
by the expansion of the good faith concept.2 32
The good faith of the employer is usually determined by
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
an inference of improper motive from the conduct itself and exercise
its duty to strike the proper balance between the asserted business
justifications and the invasion of employee rights in the light of the Act
and its policy.
0 * 0 *
Thus, in either situation once it has been proved that the employer
engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected
employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the employer to es-
tablish that it was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of moti-
vation is most accessible to him. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 33-34.2 3 0 In Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968), the court said:
The proof may ultimately indicate that there was no reasonable basis
for the employer's asserted good faith doubt. But this is not dispositive
of the case for all that is required is an honest doubt, whether or not
such doubt is justified. Id. at 876.
See also Peoples Serv. Drug Store v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1967).231 NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
232 Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968). See also NLRB v. Fash-
ion Fair, Inc., 399 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395
F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1968); Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967).
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what he says, does, or what he refuses to do at the time of his re-
fusal to recognize. 38 If there is independent evidence that an
employer, either through his words or conduct, is convinced of
the union's majority support, the courts will order him to bar-
gain.2" These types of cases, however, are very rare. In the more
typical case, the employer, after refusal to recognize, commits
substantial unfair labor practices. Initially, the courts viewed
these unfair practices as indicia of bad faith. Today, however, the
Second, Fourth and Sixth Circuits do not view his unlawful
conduct as indicia of bad faith.235
Also, these circuits have stated that there is no duty upon
the employer to give any supportable reasons for refusing to
recognize the union.2 36 Since, however, the failure to give reasons
may be some evidence of bad faith, the courts, if the employer
fails to supply reasons, will supply them for him from the record.
The courts have held the following to be good supportable
283oy Silk Mills v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 914 (1951). Here the court said:
Neither the Board nor the courts can read the minds of men. As the
Board has stated: 'In cases of this type of question of whether an em-
ployer is acting in good or bad faith at the time of the refusal is, of
course, one which of necessity must be determined in the light of all
relevant facts in the case, including any unlawful conduct of the em-
ployer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal
and the unlawful conduct.' Id. at 742.
284 The Fourth Circuit, which has rejected the theory of authorization cards,
will accept this evidence. In NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., 386 F.2d 551(4th Cir. 1967), the court stated that:
When the employer has conducted his own investigations, the re-
sults of which confirm the union's claim, we think it reliably establishes
the union's majority and the employer's lack of any good faith doubt of it.
Resurrection of that doubt after the investigation requires much more
than a very general unspecific and unelaborated suggestion that some of
the employees may have thought the union's authorization cards were
applications for insurance which would cost them nothing. . . . If we
had no more in this case than the cards and the findings of violations
of 8(a) (1) and (3), the board's order to bargain would not be en-
forced. . . . Id. at 554.
235NLRB v. Fashion Fair, Inc., 399 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968); Pulley v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d
28 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 886 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. River Togs, Inc. 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967); Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. NLBB, 377 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1967).
236 In NLRB v. Fashion Fair, 399 F.2d 764 (6th Cir 1968) the Court said:
An employer's good faith doubt is not demonstrated merely by showing that
he did not immediately set forth a reason for his good faith doubt, or in advanc-
ing no reason at all." Id. at 768. In NLRB v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 346 F.2d
936 (5th Cir. 1965), the court said that an employer is not obligated to submit
to a card check by a neutral third party in order to preserve his claim of good
faith doubt.
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reasons: (1) a rumor that the union threatened some employees
while soliciting cards-in this case the trial examiner rejected this
testimony, but the court considered it relevant as bearing upon
the employer's state of mind;237 (2) the possibility that the union
misrepresented dual authorization cards;238 (3) prior experience
with the union which lost an election years ago;239 (4) the narrow
majority of the cards; 240  (5) the hurried procedure of the
union;241 (6) such an afterthought as the rejection of the union
at the election booth;242 and (7) the filing of an unfair labor
practice charge against the union which was dismissed.243
If good faith is measured by what an employer says, does, and
ought to say when the union asks him to recognize it, the courts
by saying that his conduct (unfair labor practices) is irrelevant
and that he has no duty to say anything, have stripped good faith
of all meaning. To preserve the card authorization process and
at the same time to preserve the rights of all parties under the
Act, the following solution is suggested.
All authorization cards should be presumed to be invalid and
it should be the affirmative duty of the union to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that they are valid, free from
both misrepresentation and coercion. Any doubt concerning the
card should be resolved against the union. When a union, how-
ever, asserting majority status from the cards, makes a demand
upon the employer, a prima facie case for recognition should exist.
The employer now has a choice of four alternatives. (1) He can
recognize the union. (2) He can refuse to recognize the union
and give no supportable reasons. If he commits no substantial un-
fair labor practices, he should be entitled to an election. (3) He
can refuse recognition, decline to give supportable reasons, and
commit substantial unfair labor practices. In this situation, the
employer might be tempted, because of the legal presumption
that the cards are invalid, to defy the Board's charge and take his
chances at a trial. If the union meets its burden of proof and the
237 Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968).
238 Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1967).
239 NLRB v. Fashion Fair, Inc., 399 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 3:36 (4th Cir 1968).
240 NLRB v. Fashion Fair, Inc., 399 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968).
241 NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1968).
242 Id.
243 Pulley v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968).
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trial examiner finds the cards to be valid, the employer's unfair
labor practices, unless they are extremely minor or technical
violations, should conclusively reflect his bad faith. An 8 (a) (5)
bargaining order should issue. As a deterrent, however, for em-
ployers who do not question the union's majority through sup-
portable reasons but instead attempt to dissipate its majority
through unfair practices and attempt to profit from the legal
presumption favoring the invalidity of the cards, the Board
should order that the benefits of the collective bargaining agree-
ment should be retroactive to the date of the employer's refusal
to recognize the union. The legality of this type of remedy is now
before the Supreme Court and it is hoped that the Court will hold
that the Board possesses this power under Section 10 (c) of the
Act.244 (4) The employer can refuse recognition, give supportable
reasons and commit substantial unfair labor practices. In this
type of case, if the Board finds that the cards are valid, it should
not issue an 8 (a) (5) bargaining order because the employer had
supportable reasons which demonstrated his good faith. If, how-
ever, his unfair labor practices were of a serious 8 (a) (2) or
8 (a) (3) nature or consisted of an 8 (a) (1) widespread campaign,
the Board should issue an 8 (a) (1), (2) or (3) bargaining
order, also making the collective bargaining agreement retro-
active to the time of the employer's refusal to recognize.
Only in this way, by casting the affirmative duty upon the
union to validate its authorization cards, and by casting the
affirmative duty upon the employer to demonstrate his good faith
in refusing to recognize the union, can the policy of the National
Labor Relations Act be effectuated. It is only proper that the
Courts have rejected the Board's "final solution," yet it is felt
that it would be highly improper for the courts to reject the entire
card authorization process.
244NLRB v. Strong, 386 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36
U.S.L.W. 3452 (May 27, 1968).
